CLIMATE JUSTICE: AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES & EU POLICIES

A CALL FOR ACTION

Written by
Anne **VAN DER MEER**

FMS
Foundation Max van der Stoel

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PROGRESSIVE STUDIES

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WRITTEN BY ANNE VAN DER MEER, FMS Senior Policy Officer

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ACRONYMS

ARUWE	Action for Rural Women's Empowerment
AU	African Union
CAMGEW	Cameroon Gender and Environment Watch
CBAM	carbon border adjustment mechanism
COP	Conference of the Parties
CSOs	civil society organisations
ECA	export credit agency
EHRDs	environmental human rights defenders
EIB	European Investment Bank
EU	European Union
GCIC	Ghana Climate Innovation Centre
GHG	greenhouse gas
GNI	gross national income
MNCs	multinational companies
NDCs	nationally determined contributions
NGO	nongovernmental organisation
ODA	official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PCD	policy coherence for development
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SMEs	small and medium scale enterprises
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WECF	Women Engage for a Common Future
WMO	World Meteorological Organisation

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

People all over the world are struggling with the devastating effects of climate change, probably the biggest challenge we are facing in the world today. For African countries this is becoming more challenging every year. Droughts in South Africa impacted the supply of drinking water just a few years ago, and in Zimbabwe droughts resulted in an unstable electricity supply. Extreme weather events such as cyclones destroy coastal areas, as they did for example in Mozambique, while disrupted rain patterns are detrimental for agriculture across the whole continent. Even though African countries historically bear the least responsibility for causing climate change, the African region is hit hardest by its consequences, while being less equipped to deal with it. Moreover, African voices are insufficiently included in climate action.

Meanwhile, the world is getting closer to the point of no return. Although globally the reality of our changing climate seems to have sunken in, the pace towards minimising global warming is still not high enough. With the European Green Deal, the EU introduced an ambitious plan to become the first climate-neutral continent in 2050. It is crucial that African communities and others who are hit hardest by the impact of climate change, are taken into consideration in the elaboration of this policy.

Political action is needed, and climate-just solutions are needed. Climate justice is a principle that addresses the solutions to climate change as a people-centred, ethical and political matter, rather than a purely environmental and physical issue. This concept acknowledges that the lives of those already facing injustice are hit harder by the impacts of the climate crisis, and that the responsibility for the crisis rests with the richest countries and people more than with others. Through climate-just actions and policies the needs of the climate-vulnerable poor are taken into account leading to a more equal distribution of wealth, power and access to decision-making.

This study shows the impact of climate change on the African continent, as told by Africans themselves. We discuss the need for fair and transparent climate finance investment to improve Africa's capacity to deal with climate change. We also look at the role of the EU itself in its climate policies, as well as other policies that impact Africa. A set of progressive policy recommendations is included in the study to facilitate this process of a climate-just transition.

The voices and stories of people from all over Africa dealing with the impacts of climate change serve as the basis of this study. Many of them are unable to make their voice heard in decision-making processes. Therefore, inclusion is a condition for full participation in the global shift we have to make. The needs identified by Africans themselves should be prioritised in EU-Africa relations and resulting policies and decision-making processes.

- The EU needs to invest in a true partnership with the African continent, where its policy processes are transparent and all relevant stakeholders, including the most vulnerable, are included. EU delegations need the capacity and resources to facilitate this. Civil society organisations in African countries should be invited for policy dialogues and consultations on a structural basis. Furthermore, specific spaces should be created for the voices of groups that are underrepresented in policy dialogues, such as women in all their diversity, and youths.

Climate change is strongly linked to sustainable development. Developing countries are among the worst affected and least able to cope with the shocks of climate change to their social, economic and natural systems. Developed countries have pledged $100 billion per year in climate finance to support developing countries in their transition and to adapt to climate change. But this promise has not been kept. And there are other problems. Not everything that is counted as climate finance contributes to climate action: in most cases, climate finance is greatly overreported. Also, part of the public climate finance is made available through loans that must be repaid, and it is not always 'new and additional' as promised. An adaptation gap, furthermore, exists within public climate finance where mitigation is too often prioritised over adaptation. Finally, climate finance does not always target what is really needed. In the end, those who are most affected do not have sufficient access to climate finance that is available. This needs to change.

- Small-scale projects implemented by locally-led, community-based organisations, in particular women-led groups, can make the most significant impact, but currently lack the institutional capacity to navigate donor mechanisms. Climate finance donors, including the large climate funds, therefore need to improve their application mechanisms to become more inclusive. This can be done by:
  - reducing bureaucracy, including lowering the minimum amount and not requiring private co-finance;
  - aligning their objectives to the priorities identified by local stakeholders; and
  - using existing local government infrastructures to effectively provide local groups with grants, as well as knowledge-sharing and capacity-building.

- Public climate finance needs to prioritise the most vulnerable countries and communities. Instead of the current concentration on middle-income countries, there should be special focus on developing countries, small island states and women. These countries and groups should also be prioritised in broader climate policies by the EU. To prevent further debt distress among the most vulnerable, public climate finance needs to move away from financing through loans and the EU and its member states should take steps to cancel debts of developing countries.

Internal policies of the EU sometimes have an impact on African countries. While the European Green Deal is an ambitious plan to prevent further climate change, it must account better for the external dimension and concepts of climate justice worldwide. Negative economic, social and ecological implications for African countries should be addressed. Furthermore, the EU is committed to the concept of policy coherence for development (PCD), meaning that it is required to prevent negative externalities from EU policies on developing countries. The EU should promote positive synergies to the benefit of sustainable development policies and objectives. To uphold its PCD commitment, policies that focus on major issues, such as trade, have to be brought in line with the climate goals and EU's development objectives. The SDGs can be used as a framework to enhance coherence in international and national policy-making.

- To achieve climate justice, all EU policies, even policies that focus solely on internal issues, should be coherent with its development objectives and the objectives agreed upon internationally such as the Paris climate goals and the SDGs. Therefore, it should be mandatory for each new initiative to check in advance the expected impact on developing countries, and on the realisation of the climate goals and the SDGs. When an initiative does not pass, it should be revised or withdrawn.

- Climate justice needs to become a guiding principle in the European Green Deal. The international context should be taken into account in all policies and EU law resulting from the Green Deal. The impact assessment framework should be used to ensure that policies do not come at the expense of other goals and commitments. Climate action should safeguard human rights and social and economic resilience everywhere in the world.

The coming year is a crucial period for action. With the upcoming Climate Summit in Glasgow in November, countries have the opportunity to raise their ambitions. For next year, the 6th AU-EU Summit is on the agenda: a defining moment for the future direction of cooperation between Africa and the EU.

The full set of policy recommendations for climate-just EU policies can be found at the end of this policy study.

> *"Inclusion is a condition for full participation in the global shift we have to make."*

INTRODUCTION

Climate change is the biggest challenge we face in the world today. Everywhere we are seeing its impact. People are struggling with the devastating effects in their daily lives. For African countries this is becoming more challenging every year. Even though it is historically least responsible for causing climate change, the African region is hit hardest by its consequences. Furthermore, African countries are less equipped to deal with the climate crisis, given the increasing global inequality, and access to the fora where solutions are created, is often limited. For African countries, the road to a climate-just transition is long and winding.

The world is getting closer to the point of no return. Although globally the reality of our changing climate seems to have sunken in, the pace towards minimising global warming is still not high enough. At his hearing as Commissioner-designate in November 2019, First Executive Vice President of the European Commission Frans Timmermans, responsible for the European Green Deal, committed that 'reducing greenhouse gases, reducing the increase in temperature, global warming, attacks on proceeding with biodiversity are things which go together and [...] are now a matter of urgency'.[1] The European Green Deal is an ambitious plan for Europe to become the first climate-neutral continent in 2050. Unfortunately, the needs of African communities, hit hardest by the climate crisis, are insufficiently taken into consideration in European policy and decision-making debates. This is a mistake and an omission in the European Union's (EU) policy creation. It is our ambition, as political foundations, that our research contributes to a better understanding of what these needs are.

It is crucial that we acknowledge that combating climate change is strongly linked to sustainable development. Being Africa's neighbouring continent, the EU will also benefit from sustainable development in Africa. Climate change disrupts this development. Developing countries are among the most adversely affected and least able to cope with the shocks of climate change to their social, economic and natural systems. At the same time, the much-needed economic development of these countries often goes hand in hand with increasing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, thereby contributing to climate change. We face the dilemma that these countries will have to adopt an economic growth path that is sustainable, but in the short run also very costly and potentially negatively impacting the economic development of those countries. Is this fair?

Economic development can in principle provide an opportunity to drive the transition towards climate neutrality, but this takes huge investment and is therefore a major challenge, especially in poorer countries. The young population in Africa adds to the urgency to promote economic development in African countries. Nonetheless, in our responses to climate change we often exclude the poorest and most vulnerable communities, leaving them further behind and increasing global inequalities, as well as inequalities within countries. The most important decisions regarding climate action are often made by those who do not feel the biggest impact and who generally have better capabilities to deal with climate change themselves. Not everyone affected by climate change is able to make their voice heard in the decision-making processes. Therefore, inclusion is a condition for full participation in the global shift we have to make.

The high degree of vulnerability of the countries on the African continent is partially due to the geographical location of the continent, with a tropical climate that results in higher climate variability and more frequent weather extremes. On top of that, many African communities are dealing with social and economic development challenges which limit their capacity to adapt to the effects of climate change. While climate change has a much more severe impact on countries in Africa than those in the global North, a similar distinction can be made on more levels; within countries, between different classes, between generations and gender. In general, the most marginalised, including young people and women, are impacted more by climate change.

So political action is needed. There can be no positive and radical change without a major increase in ambitions with regard to climate policies. There can be no justice without the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders. Climate justice is a principle that addresses the solutions to climate change as a people-centred, ethical, and political matter, rather than an environmental and physical issue only. This concept acknowledges that the lives of those already facing injustice are hit harder by the impacts of the climate crisis, and that the responsibility for the crisis rests with the richest countries and people more than with others. Through climate-just actions and policies the needs of the climate-vulnerable poor are taken into account leading to a more equal distribution of wealth, power, and access to decision-making.

This next year can be defined as a crucial period during which the **EU** is able to show its political ambitions towards climate justice. At the same time the COVID-19 pandemic is still present in the world, meaning that climate action needs to also take the impact of the COVID-19 crisis into consideration. Moreover, in November 2021, the United Kingdom – in partnership with Italy – will host the 26th United Nations (UN) Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) in Glasgow. Under the framework of the Paris Agreement, countries must evaluate their national ambitions every five years. The upcoming COP26 will be the first time that countries will do so officially, committing to enhanced ambitions. Furthermore, the 6th African Union (AU) - EU Summit is also on the agenda for the coming year. This is a defining moment for the future direction of cooperation between the two continents. This is a defining moment to counter climate change together.

This policy study will show the impact of climate change on the African continent, as told by Africans themselves.[2] We will discuss the need for fair and transparent climate finance investments to expand Africa's capacity to deal with climate change. But we also look at the role of the EU itself in its own climate policies, and other policies that impact Africa. The overarching conclusion is that it is essential to bring African perspectives into the European climate debate. After all, they will be the ones to be first and foremost affected. By not having 'a seat at the table' the injustice becomes even greater. For climate justice to prevail it is key that African perspectives are taken into account and serve as guiding principles. This policy study is an attempt to do just that. We call upon universities, research institutes and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) to follow the same path. We call upon the EU and its national governments to take these voices seriously. Our policy recommendations at the end of this policy study will contribute to fair and inclusive EU climate policies that reflect African perspectives and pursue climate justice. This is the time to take action.

> ***"For climate justice to prevail it is key that African perspectives are taken into account and serve as guiding principles."***

1 European Parliament, *Commitments made at the hearing of Frans Timmermans, Executive Vice President-designate European Green Deal*, PE 638.437, November 2019, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/638437/IPOL_BRI(2019)638437_EN.pdf.

2 See the annex for more information on the research methods used in the policy study.

THE SEVERE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

Climate change is an existing and increasingly serious threat for African countries as Africa is among the continents most vulnerable to climate change. Those who are impacted worst, should be heard when discussing solutions. Therefore, in this chapter we show some of these impacts of the climate emergency on the African continent. With the help of journalists and partners on the continent we gathered stories to identify and illustrate the impact of climate change on daily lives in Africa. Besides these stories, we also set up a survey to ask some Africans[3] about the impact of climate change on their lives. These results are also used in this chapter.

In the survey we asked the question: 'What are the most visible consequences of climate change in your community or country?' Almost two-thirds of the respondents (67.7%) identified irregular rainfall as a key consequence. Other often mentioned consequences were rising temperatures (56.6%), heat extremes (41.4%), and natural disasters (41.4%).[4]

FIGURE 1 - MOST VISIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE CHANGE



(source: survey, see annex)

3 See the annex for the full survey and more information on the group of respondents.

4 Information based on the survey carried out by FEPS and FMS. The total number of respondents was 99. Because multiple answers were possible, percentages may add up to more than 100%.

FACTSHEET: CLIMATE CHANGE IN AFRICA

Africa is the world's second-largest continent, both in terms of population and size, with 30.3 million square meters of land and an estimated population of 1.3 billion divided over 54 countries.[5] In spite of its size, Africa is **not a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions**. While this figure will increase moderately to meet pressing development needs, the continent currently produces only **4%** of the world's emissions.[6]

Despite its limited contribution to climate change, Africa is hit hardest by climate change impacts. This is partially due to its location, as climate variability is higher in countries with a tropical climate.[7] Out of the ten countries most vulnerable to climate change, seven are in Africa.[8] Average temperatures in Africa are projected to increase at a rate faster than the global average in all scenarios. Much of Africa has **already warmed by more than 1°C since 1901**.[9] Consequently, Africa is experiencing an **increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events**, such as heatwaves, periods of drought, cyclones and floods.[10] Africa recorded 56 of such extreme weather events in 2019, compared to 45 in 2018, affecting a total of 16.6 million people in 29 African countries.[11] Extreme events lead to population displacement and increased pressure on and conflicts about water resources.[12]

Africa's vulnerability to such climate change impacts is exacerbated by several factors:

- Since agriculture is the backbone of Africa's economy, employing 60% of its population, climate change has devastating effects on food security in the drought-prone sub-Saharan countries. Between 2012 and 2020, the number of undernourished people in that region **increased by 45.6%**.[13]

- Sub-Saharan Africa is home to **more than half of the world's extreme poor**, with 400 million people. The poorest live in rural areas and work in agriculture, where climate change is hitting hardest. It is women and girls who are particularly affected, as they are more likely than men to be already living in poverty. On top of this, the population of sub-Saharan Africa is expected to triple this century, increasing from 1.06 billion in 2019 to 3.7 billion in 2100.[14]

- Climate change poses an urgent threat to future generations, affecting young people in all aspects of their lives, especially their opportunities, choices and mental and physical wellbeing. Africa is **the world's youngest continent.** Almost 60% of Africa's population is under the age of 25. Nineteen out of the world's twenty youngest countries are in Africa. The top three – Niger, Mali and Chad – have the world's youngest populations, with a median age of 15.2, 16.3 and 16.6 years respectively.[15]

5 Plus two de facto states with limited or no recognition.

6 Lacour Ayompe et al., 'Trends and drivers of African fossil fuel CO_2 emissions 1990-2017,' *Environmental Research Letters* 15, no. 12 (2020), https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/abc64f.

7 Michel Boko et al., 'Africa', in *Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, ed. M.L. Parry et al. (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 433-467, https://archive.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter9.pdf.

8 'Climate change in Africa', African Development Bank Group, COP25, last accessed June 2021, https://www.afdb.org/en/cop25/climate-change-africa.

9 'Climate change is an increasing threat to Africa', United Nations Climate Change, news, 27 October 2020, https://unfccc.int/news/climate-change-is-an-increasing-threat-to-africa.

10 Greenpeace, *Weathering the storm. Extreme weather events and climate change in Africa*, Greenpeace Research Laboratories Technical Report (Review) 04-2020, https://www.greenpeace.org/africa/en/weathering-the-storm-extreme-weather-events-and-climate-change-in-africa/.

11 'International Disasters Database,' Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, last accessed June 2021, https://www.emdat.be/.

12 UN Climate Change, 'Climate change is an increasing threat to Africa'.

13 UN Climate Change, 'Climate change is an increasing threat to Africa'.

14 Greenpeace, *Weathering the storm*.

15 Joe Myers, '19 of the world's 20 youngest countries are in Africa', *World Economic Forum*, 30 August 2019, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/08/youngest-populations-africa/.

THE SEVERE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

The World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) calls Africa 'an exposure and vulnerability 'hot spot' for climate variability and change impacts'.[16] The impact of climate change on the continent is however different for every region. The western Sahel region is mostly impacted by an increase in the length of dry spells. Together with a higher incidence of floods, this severely impacts people's food security. Central Africa has seen an increase in heavy rainfall and, together with West Africa, it has experienced the largest increase in the number of hot days. The greatest regional increase in temperature is expected in Southern Africa, leading to an increase in drought frequency and number of heatwaves.[17]

Additionally, many African communities struggle with weak adaptive capacities to climate change due to development challenges.

These consequences of climate change have an impact on people's daily lives. The second question asked in the survey focused on these direct effects of climate change: 'What direct effects of these consequences of climate change do you experience on the livelihood of people in your community or country?' As can be seen in the figure below, most frequently mentioned were food insecurity (64.6%), flooding (59.6%), and the shrinking productivity in agriculture (57.6%).[18]

FIGURE 2 - IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE



(source: survey, see annex)

16 World Meteorological Organisation, *State of the climate in Africa 2019* (Geneva: WMO, 2020), 3, https://library.wmo.int/doc_num.php?explnum_id=10421.

17 Dan Shepard, 'Global warming: severe consequences for Africa,' *Africa Renewal*, December 2018-March 2019, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2018-march-2019/global-warming-severe-consequences-africa.

18 Information based on the survey carried out by FEPS and FMS. The total number of respondents was 99. Because multiple answers were possible, percentages may add up to more than 100%.

One, anonymous, respondent from Zambia illustrated the effects of droughts in his region: 'A number of communities had a food crisis due to poor yield as a result of poor rainfall that caused droughts. The price of staple food, mielie meal (maize meal) was also seen on the rise as a consequence.'[19] For farmers, heat extremes and droughts tremendously increase uncertainty, often resulting in food insecurity. According to numbers by the Food and Agricultural Organisation, food insecurity is on the rise in most African regions, and since 2012 the number of undernourished people has increased by 45.6%.[20] Heat also results in droughts. Juliet Anderson from Sierra Leone mentioned that due to the extreme heat, taps do not open regularly and that hand dug wells are almost beginning to dry up. Furthermore, due to the heat people often fall ill.[21]

Droughts are part of the pattern of irregular rainfall, but so are floods. Two respondents from DR Congo mentioned that 'landslides have become more pronounced, disrupting the seasons following the droughts'[22], and that 'it rains so much more than in previous years'.[23] Respondents from other countries also pointed out many examples of heavy rainfall resulting in floods destroying towns and infrastructure. This uncertainty clearly has an impact on agriculture, which in many countries in Africa is one of the key sectors of the economy, and employs a majority of the population.

Moreover, climate change also impacts other aspects of the economy and daily lives. In Zambia, a country dependent on hydropower for its energy supply, limited rainfall increases the likelihood of load shedding where parts of the energy supply are shut down for a limited period of time, to prevent a broader black out.[24] Boniface Kumwende from Malawi noticed a loss of capacity to work; due to the heat, people work fewer hours in some parts of the country, which reduces income for certain families.[25] And in many countries, respondents saw a rise in tropical diseases, due to flooding and the changing climate.

UN organisations also warn of the risk of climate change impacting economic growth in developing countries: a 1°C rise in temperature lowers economic growth by about 1.2% by reducing agricultural output, suppressing the productivity of workers exposed to heat, slowing investment and damaging health.[26]

WHAT DO AFRICANS NEED?

The stories above illustrate the enormous impact of the climate emergency on Africa. Climate change further exacerbates existing inequalities, as Africa already continues to lag behind most of the world when it comes to socioeconomic development. Limited capacities to deal with climate change intensifies its impacts on the African continent. The longer sustainable solutions to this crisis are postponed, the worse these inequalities will get. We need to find ways to ensure sustainable development within the limits of preventing further climate change.

In 2015, the world committed to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) call to 'leave no one behind'; by ending poverty, protecting the planet, and ensuring peace and prosperity by 2030.[27] SDG 13, on climate action, aims to integrate climate change measures into national policies and to address the needs of developing countries to adapt to climate change and invest in low-carbon development. Ultimately, all the SDGs are integrated and indivisible. Supporting SDG 13 will also contribute to reaching the other SDGs, as long as they go hand in hand with 'disaster risk measures, sustainable natural resource management, and human security into national development strategies.'[28] On the other hand, if we do not act on climate change now, many of the other SDGs within Africa will be even harder to achieve. At the moment, all African regions, except North Africa, are unlikely to meet the SDGs.[29]

19 Survey answer by someone who wished to remain anonymous, Zambia, 9 November 2020.

20 WMO, *State of the climate in Africa 2019*, 18.

21 Survey answer by Juliet Anderson, Bambara Town Women's Organisation, Sierra Leone, 9 November 2020.

22 Survey answer by someone who wished to remain anonymous, DR Congo, 26 November 2020.

23 Survey answer by Nzama Kifoto, Programme National de la Santé au Travail, DR Congo, 26 November 2020.

24 Based on case study by Andrew Mambondiyani, September 2020.

25 Survey answer by Boniface Kumwenda, GOAL Malawi, Malawi, 27 November 2020.

26 WMO, *State of the climate in Africa 2019,* 24.

27 'What are the Sustainable Development goals,' United Nations Development Programme, SDGs, last accessed June 2021, https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html#:~:text=The%20Sustainable%20Development%20Goals%20(SDGs,peace%20and%20prosperity%20by%202030.

28 'Goal 13: Climate Action,' United Nations Development Programme, SDGs, last accessed June 2021, https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/goal-13-climate-action.html.

29 The Sustainable Development Goals Center for Africa, *SDGs implementation in Africa: Reflections on a three-year journey*, conference report, Kigali: 12-14 June 2019, https://sdgcafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/SDGCs-Implementationin-Africa-Reflection-on-3Y-Journey_Report.pdf.



THE SEVERE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

It is clear that urgent climate action is needed. Potential solutions should not only tackle the climate emergency, but do so in coherence with other development challenges and – most importantly – put people at the core, respecting their rights. This starts with making sure that those who are impacted worst are heard when discussing solutions. What is actually needed in African countries to tackle the impacts of climate change? Incorporating these needs in climate and development policies smooths the pathway towards fair solutions to the climate crisis that work, also in the local context. 'Politicians must realise the need to address all climate-related issues and integrate climate change solutions in their proposed policies,' James Kapeshi from Zambia stressed in the survey.[30]

Through the survey we asked respondents to name the most important sectors to invest in in order to be able to deal with climate change in their regions. Two sectors stood out: investing in climate-proof agriculture (67.7%) and investing in renewable energy (65.7%). A majority of the respondents also identified investments focusing on the conservation of ecosystems (53.5%) as crucial, while four out of ten emphasised the importance of water resource management (43.4%).[31]

FIGURE 3 - SECTORS TO INVEST IN IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH CLIMATE CHANGE



(source: survey, see annex)

What do these sectors entail? And what can be done to improve current situations, according to our respondents? In the following paragraphs we describe the sectors of the highest priority and illustrate its importance by providing cases and examples.

CLIMATE-PROOF AGRICULTURE

At first glance, the relationship between agriculture and climate change seems quite obvious: agriculture is directly dependent on climatic factors; any change in those factors affects agriculture either positively or negatively. On the other hand, agriculture is also an important source of GHG emissions, thereby contributing towards climate change.[32] Climate-proof agriculture thus ultimately needs to deal with both those sides of the coin: it should be able to deal with the already existing impacts of climate change in a way that limits its contribution to further climate change.

30 Survey answer by James Kapeshi, Zambia, 9 November 2020.

31 Information based on the survey carried out by FEPS and FMS. The total number of respondents was 99. Because multiple answers were possible, the percentages may add up to more than 100%.

32 Hamere Yohannes, 'A Review on Relationship between Climate Change and Agriculture,' *Journal of Earth Science & Climatic Change* 7, no. 2 (January 2015), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304207131_A_Review_on_Relationship_between_Climate_Change_and_Agriculture.

FOOD INSECURITY IN SOUTH KIVU (DR CONGO)

By Appoline Olinga, Coordinator, Women's journalist organisations, DR Congo

No region in Africa is spared by the effects of climate change. Also in my region, the province of South Kivu in DR Congo, climate change can be felt noticeably. Several sectors have already been affected, leading to disastrous consequences. Damage to ecosystems, water scarcity, and rising conflict and insecurity are direct effects of climate change, to name only a few.

Yet, at the top of this list is the agricultural sector, which is facing a changing climate, disrupted seasons, repeated floods, landslides and strong winds washing away houses and devastating crops. As a consequence, agricultural production throughout the Great Lakes Region has been very low. Nzama Kifoto from 'Programme National de la Santé au Travail' in DR Congo explained that 'it rains so much that it destroys the (planted) seeds'. As a result, cassava and maize production is decreasing, two crops that form the predominant food source. This all clears a direct path towards food insecurity.

Photo © Axel Fassio (CIFOR)

With around two-thirds of the African population working in the agricultural sector, agricultural changes have an enormous socio-economic impact. 'Agriculture is at the heart of many surviving households, especially in rural areas, and they are the most affected by drought as they only have this one source of food,' explained one of the respondents from Zambia on why climate-proof agriculture is so crucial.[33] Short-term adaptation solutions are necessary. At the same time, Africa's GHG emissions from agriculture are among the fastest growing emissions in the world.[34] With population growth and accompanying food demand on the rise, it is crucial to reduce a further rise in GHG emissions.

On top of that there is the conversion of non-agricultural lands like forests into agricultural land, with a devastating impact for local plants and species. Generally speaking, intensification of agriculture, often by large (multinational) companies, limits the ability to prevent further climate change, compared to small-scale agriculture.[35] What can also be seen is that the EU promotes monoculture within agricultural production, to support economic development, but this kind of production generally hinders tackling climate change as well.[36]

RENEWABLE ENERGY

Fossil fuels, including coal, oil and gas, are the biggest contributors to GHG emission and consequently the main contributor to climate change. The challenge in Africa is, again, twofold. On the one hand, the use of fossil fuels and other unsustainable sources of energy has to be limited, while on the other hand many African countries are dealing with a huge energy shortage. About 600 million Africans, nearly half of the population, does not have access to electricity, and 80% of sub-Saharan African companies suffer frequent electricity disruptions leading to economic losses.[37] Access to energy is thus crucial. Currently, coal, gas and oil make up the large majority of electricity generation in Africa, up to 64%. Renewable energy sources are less common, with only 2.4% of electricity in sub-Saharan Africa coming from this source.[38] In some countries in Africa hydropower is also an important energy source, with sometimes more than 80% of electricity generation coming from this source.[39]

33 Survey answer by someone who wished to remain anonymous, Zambia, 9 November 2020.

34 Between 1994 and 2014, the GHG emissions from agriculture in Africa increased at an average annual rate of between 2.9% and 3.1%, see: Mphethe Isaac Tongwane and Mokhele Edmond Moeletsi, 'A review of greenhouse gas emissions from the agriculture sector in Africa,' *Agricultural systems* 166 (2018): 124-134, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0308521X17309423?via%3Dihub.

35 Interview by author with Hanne Knaepen, ECDPM, 5 January 2021.

36 Sophie Desmidt, *Climate change and security in North Africa. Focus on Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia* (ECDPM, 2021), 34, https://www.cascades.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/CASCADES-Research-paper-Climate-change-and-security-in-North-Africa-1.pdf.

37 IEA, *Africa energy outlook 2019*, World Energy Outlook Special Report (Paris: IEA, 2019), 4, https://www.iea.org/reports/africa-energy-outlook-2019.

38 IEA, *Africa energy outlook 2019*.

39 IEA, *Climate impacts on African hydropower* (Paris: IEA, 2020), https://www.iea.org/reports/climate-impacts-on-african-hydropower.



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HYDROPOWER IN ZIMBABWE

By Andrew Mambondiyani, Climate journalist, Zimbabwe

In Zimbabwe, most of the energy supply comes from hydropower plants. The Kariba South Hydropower Station, located in Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands, is one of the main sources of electricity for the citizens of Zimbabwe. However, because of climate change, hydropower as a source of energy becomes highly unreliable. Extreme droughts severely affected hydropower generation at Kariba and other hydropower plants. During the 2015-2016 and 2018-2020 droughts, the country struggled with massive electricity shortages which forced some parts of the country to live without electricity for 18 hours per day.

Phillip Muranda, a local entrepreneur who runs a small welding shop, experiences the effects of this on a daily basis: 'Business has gone down and very soon we will be out of business. For big and heavy welding jobs I have to wait for the electricity and this is forcing me to work in the middle of the night'. The same is true for local vegetable vendor Lindiwe Matambo. For years, she has cooked her vegetables with the help of electricity. Not only because it is easier, but also because cooking with firewood is bad for human health and the environment. However, because of the electricity outages she has to choose between cooking with firewood she needs to gather in the nearby mountains, and cooking in the middle of the night, when electricity is available. She does not expect things to change soon: 'I don't even know what is happening, but the electricity situation is now critical. I don't think it will improve soon'.

In Zimbabwe and other African countries, people are heavily reliant on unsustainable energy sources. Investment is needed to provide sustainable access to energy. Zimbabwe has embraced up to $5 billion from China to invest in highly polluting coal-fired thermal power plants. Instead, there should be deliberate efforts to harness other forms of renewable energy like solar and wind energy. Therefore, strong action is needed from both the government and the private sector to tackle this African energy crisis.

Photo © Andrew Mambondiyani

Fossil energy sources have to be limited to mitigate their impact on the changing climate. Moreover, energy sources such as hydropower are heavily impacted by climate change already. Irregular rainfall and extended periods of drought limit the reliability of hydropower in countries like Zimbabwe. There is a rising demand for alternative clean energy sources that are not only sustainable and stable, but also mitigate the effects of climate change in the long term. This is especially important because it is expected that in 2040, 90% of the people without access to electricity will be living on the African continent.[40]

Zimbabwean economist Victor Bhoroma emphasised that, for Zimbabwe, it is no longer sustainable to depend on hydroelectricity. He stressed that in order to diversify the country's energy supply, the government needs to create the right policy framework for private sector investments to invest.[41] When done right, it will also enable African countries to leapfrog over polluting infrastructure. Other good news is that prices of renewable energy are falling fast, making it easier to make these investments in renewable energy instead of fossil fuels.[42]

BEEKEEPING IN CAMEROON

Case study by Cameroon Gender and Environment Watch (CAMGEW)

Photo © Shutterstock

In the Kilum-Ijim forests in Cameroon, bushfires are a regular event. Since 2012, many bushfires have affected the country, destroying the biodiversity with little concern from the communities. The fires are mostly due to 'slash-and-burn': burning down parts of nature for agriculture. This method was in the past not particularly dangerous, but due to climate change the climate has become exceptionally dry, making these small fires extremely risky.

Furthermore, the fires destroy parts of the biodiversity in the region. The communities consequently destroy tools that are very important for fighting climate change. Forests, but especially the biodiversity within, are important features in for example storage of greenhouse gases. CAMGEW therefore supports apiculture. When local communities own beehives in the forests, they no longer burn it down. And if bushfires occur, they will put them out to protect their beehives, which helps to protect the forest.

To ensure sustainable management of the forest, women's participation is essential. As a gender organisation, CAMGEW engaged them in training on apiculture and provided them with beehives to start them off. Apiculture became a source of hope and income for many poor communities in this area, and bushfires were reduced to zero in 2020 (from seven in 2012).

CONSERVATION OF ECOSYSTEMS

Rapid climate change has a profound impact on ecosystems and biodiversity in the world. Ecosystems play an important role in regulating climate, and thus adapting to and mitigating climate change. As Mayaya Singu summarised it in the survey, 'agriculture, energy, and the destruction of ecosystems are the biggest contributors to climate change globally'.[43]

Ecosystems are already being affected by climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, for example, states with high confidence that risks from desertification are projected to increase due to climate change.[44] And both climate change and desertification will increase the loss of biodiversity, says the same report, again with high confidence.[45] Due to the speed of climate change, ecosystems do not have the capacity to adapt to the new situation. Furthermore, the destruction of ecosystems limits the capability of those systems to adapt to and mitigate climate change. Human actions exacerbate this: recently logged forested areas are prone to erosion due to heavy rains.

40 IEA, *Africa energy outlook 2019*.

41 Interview with Victor Bhoroma by Andrew Mambondiyani, September 2020.

42 Leo Holtz and Christine Golubski, 'Figures of the week: Africa's renewable energy potential,' Brookings, Africa in Focus, 5 May 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2021/05/05/figures-of-the-week-africas-renewable-energy-potential/.

43 Survey answer by Mayaya K. Singu, SuBeHuDe, Tanzania, 11 November 2020.

44 IPCC, *Special report on Climate change and land* (Geneva: IPCC, 2019), chapter 3, https://www.ipcc.ch/srccl/chapter/chapter-3/.

45 IPCC, *Special report on Climate change and land*, chapter 3.

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Reforestation and sustainable management of ecosystems have the ability to positively impact mission levels, sustainable agriculture and sustainable water resource management. Overall, conservation of ecosystems is proving to be an important factor to focus on in the African fight against climate change. However, specific finance for the protection of biodiversity is lacking and policy instruments are largely missing.[46] At the minimum, policies – including climate policies – should not harm biodiversity, and preferably promote it. This can be problematic in relation to the energy transition, as for example mining is detrimental for biodiversity.

WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Water is key to life, but heavily impacted by climate change. Many examples have already been given on droughts and their impact on the lives of Africans. But also due to climate change, rainfall is more unpredictable and floods happen more often. This impacts agriculture, and thus food security as well, but also has profound implications for the availability of clean drinking water. Someone from Zambia who wished to remain anonymous explained that 'a number of communities don't have access to clean water, which makes them vulnerable to different diseases'.[47] Due to exhausted water reserves and dried up dams, entire communities and cities are running out of water. Effective water resource management is at the core of climate resilience.

> ***"Effective water resource management is at the core of climate resilience."***

WATER IN CAPE TOWN

By Andrew Mambondiyani, Climate journalist, Zimbabwe

In 2018, Cape Town struggled with its water supply and the city almost completely ran out of water. How was it possible that a city could run out of water? Cape Town relies on reservoirs of rain water for its water supply. In 2018, the reservoirs had not been fully replenished for three years: the worst drought in over a century in South Africa. Therefore, city residents had to stick to strict water saving measures, being allowed to only use 50 litres a day. According to Cape Town resident Donny Madanhire, the situation has now improved, although residents still have to save water despite high water levels in the dams that supply the city: 'as residents, we must play our part by not taking water for granted and continue to save water even during times of plenty'.

Photo © City of Cape Town

According to another resident, Lazarus Makateve, there are still water problems in informal settlements where there is no piped water supply. Even though it the water crisis appears to be over, Lazarus warns that 'in the future, if there are severe droughts again, the water crisis will automatically come back'.

That is why mayoral committee member for water and waste, Xanthea Limberg, urges for alternative water supply sources for the future, as the present situation is not sustainable. She argues that people all over the world should get used to a 'new normal': 'Many communities around the world are grappling with climate uncertainty and how to balance preparation for climate change with the current needs and preferences of their populations. Many more communities will soon need to realise the degree to which water availability has been taken for granted'.

46 More on the topic of climate finance in the next chapter.

47 Survey answer by someone who wished to remain anonymous, Zambia, 9 November 2020.

While water sanitation is a core component of climate resilience, it is also greatly impacted by the behaviour of citizens. However, insufficient funds are available for communication and engagement projects targeted at behavioural change. Furthermore, the behaviour of companies is also of importance. Companies should be prevented from taking the cleanest water and letting neighbouring villages deal with water that is less clean and less suitable for consumption.

THE ISSUE OF LOSS AND DAMAGE

When discussing 'what is needed' to deal with climate change, the financial capacity of countries to be able to adapt to or mitigate climate change cannot be overlooked. As Jonathan Nkhata from Zambia emphasised: 'Zambia is a developing country that has a lot of economic challenges. Therefore it cannot meet the financial needs when such events occur.'[48] The same applies to many countries in Africa. This issue of climate finance will be discussed further in the next chapter. However, the issue of 'loss and damage' is often excluded from traditional discussions on climate finance, which solely focus on adaptation and mitigation. Loss and damage refers to the – financial and societal – costs of climate impacts that are unavoidable.[49] Adaptation measures are no longer sufficient to prevent this kind of damage.

This case on Mozambique shows not only the need for additional financing for adaptation and mitigation measures, but it also showcases the impact of a cyclone that destroyed almost the whole city. Adaptation and mitigation have limits: climate change is already happening and, for example, is already increasing the number of cyclones in the region of Mozambique. Cyclone Idai resulted in at least 1,200 deaths, many people had to leave their homes, and there was an estimated $2 billion economic loss. To be able to recover, Mozambique has borrowed more than $100 million from the International Monetary Fund, risking a future debt crisis.[50]

RISING SEA LEVEL AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN MOZAMBIQUE

By Andrew Mambondiyani, Climate journalist, Zimbabwe

Photo © Andrew Mambondiyani

Beira, one of the largest cities in Mozambique, is located just a few metres above sea level on the Indian Ocean coast, leaving 120,000 of the 500,000 residents susceptible to the dangers of sea level rise, storm surges and floods.

In March 2019, Beira was battered by Cyclone Idai, one of the deadliest cyclones to hit Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi. The cyclone destroyed up to 90% of the city. It showed that the capacity and quality of the drainage system and coastal protection are currently insufficient to effectively protect Beira against flooding. At the same time, Beira has hardly any flood-proof land available for construction and urban development purposes. And with climate change causing more weather-related disasters, Beira urgently needs to adapt to the effects of rising sea levels, severe rainfall and droughts.

Climate change effects such as intensifying rainfall and sea level rise are increasing Beira's vulnerability to floods and coastal erosion. In 2014, the city of Beira with the support of Dutch companies drafted the Masterplan Beira 2035 aimed at overhauling the city's water management infrastructure. The implementation of the Masterplan requires coordinated and integrated planning, sustainable cooperation between important stakeholders and large investments. Evidently, these requirements cannot be met overnight and will require a long-term process in which stakeholder trust and cooperation are substantially improved and in which radical institutional changes are made. But with more than $100 million needed to fully implement the Masterplan, it remains to be seen whether the plan will come to fruition.

48 Survey answer by Jonathan Nkhata, Zambia Climate Change Network, Zambia, 11 November 2020.

49 Roz Pidcock and Sophie Yeo, 'Explainer: Dealing with the "loss and damage" caused by climate change,' Carbon Brief, 9 May 2017, https://www.carbonbrief.org/explainer-dealing-with-the-loss-and-damage-caused-by-climate-change. Climate finance will be further discussed in the next chapter.

50 Natalie Sauer, 'Mozambique "faces climate debt trap" as Cyclone Kenneth follows Idai,' Climate Home News, 26 April 2019, https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/04/26/mozambique-faces-climate-debt-trap-cyclone-kenneth-follows-idai/.

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Loss and damage would limit this kind of financial damage from climate change for developing countries. In 2013, a special mechanism was created to address this issue.[51] It did, however, not provide for any liability. The 2015 Paris Agreement also refers to loss and damage, but developed countries successfully added a clause that states that loss and damage 'does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation'.[52] Currently, it is still unclear what loss and damage exactly is under the process of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), meaning that the needs of the most vulnerable remain, to a large extent, ignored.[53]

WHO TAKES RESPONSIBILITY?

So far, this chapter has focused on the impact of climate change on the African continent and what is needed to deal with this impact according to Africans themselves. In the survey, we also asked the respondents 'who should take the responsibility when it comes to dealing with climate change in your community, country or region?' Respondents could give multiple answers and many of them ticked (nearly) all of the boxes. Most priority was given to citizens (78.8%), national governments (65.7%), and local governments (57.6%) as the key actors, followed by NGOs and other local organisations (respectively 53.5% and 45.5%).[54] One of the respondents from Congo, Jean Pierre Materanya, explained: 'Governments have the primary responsibility, and they must act through communities. Both national and international NGOs must assist the government in its efforts.'[55]

FIGURE 4 - WHO SHOULD TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY?



(source: survey, see annex)

An anonymous respondent explained the importance of local perspectives: 'Without grassroots participation nothing can move forward. In action and planning, the national government must start from the grassroots. No country can take ownership of the global warming issue alone. No country can be left out of this issue. Local, national and international organisations must all be involved in a complementary way.'[56]

The call to include grassroot organisations has also been made clearly. Not only in the implementation of projects, but also in the drafting of policy solutions. Local organisations need to be heard and need to have access to financing to start projects. African perspectives are thus crucial.

But the role of multinational companies also cannot be overlooked. They are important actors, because they are major contributors to GHG emissions and thus to climate change. Emissions from the supply chain of very large companies can be larger than the emissions of many countries.[57] Guichelle Consola Taly, from Gabon, thus sees multinational companies (MNCs) as the actors who bear the first responsibility: 'They are the biggest polluters'.[58] Therefore it is important that also companies take their responsibility in preventing GHG emissions in their supply chain.

> ***"Without grassroots participation nothing can move forward."***

SMEs IN GHANA

Interview with Rukayatu Sanusi, Ghana Climate Innovation Centre (GCIC)

'We see a strong linkage between private enterprise, climate change, economic development, and ecological prosperity,' says Rukayatu Sanusi, Executive Director of Ghana Climate Innovation Centre (GCIC). A big part of Ruka's work is finding ways to get every single person, including consumers, to think about climate change and to make demands on businesses to consider 'greening' their production, manufacturing processes, operations and services.

In Ghana, Ruka emphasises, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) contribute about 70% of the country's gross domestic product – a major share. And this is the case for most countries across the African continent. Getting SMEs on board on the transition to a low-carbon economy is therefore crucial. 'If we can get them to be more climate-smart in their strategies and operations, you'll have more businesses thinking about a low-carbon economy,' Ruka explains. And thinking about a low-carbon economy is essential: although Ghana is not a large emitter of GHGs at the present time, this will most likely change as its economy matures. The time is ticking away for transitioning to a low-carbon economy, and SMEs must be part of the solution.

GCIC supports entrepreneurs in pioneering adaptive and mitigating solutions for climate change issues in Ghana. One example of such an entrepreneur is West African Feeds.[59] This company uses food waste to process black soldier fly larvae into protein cakes. These then serve as animal feed for, for example, chickens. This immediately tackles a second problem in Ghana, namely that chickens are mostly imported, because animal feed is too expensive. This full circular economy business model thus kills two birds with one stone.

One approach that GCIC sees that could catalyse the transition is for larger, private businesses to use more SMEs and work more with them in their supply chains. This shows the demand for alternative mechanisms for support: a need to 'microfy' support, but in such a way that it doesn't get lost in bureaucracy, says Ruka.

51 'Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate change impacts,' United Nations Climate Change, UNFCCC Topics, last accessed June 2021, https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/loss-and-damage-ld/warsaw-international-mechanism-for-loss-and-damage-associated-with-climate-change-impacts-wim.

52 UNFCCC, *Report of the Conference of Parties on its twenty-first session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015*, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf.

53 Dr. Dáithí Stone, Lawrence Berkely Lab, as quoted in Roz Pidcock and Sophie Yeo, 'Explainer: Dealing with the "loss and damage" caused by climate change,' Carbon Brief, 9 May 2017, https://www.carbonbrief.org/explainer-dealing-with-the-loss-and-damage-caused-by-climate-change.

54 Information based on the survey carried out by FEPS and FMS. The total number of respondents was 99. Because multiple answers were possible, the sum of all percentages is more than 100%.

55 Survey answer by Jean Pierre Materanya, INECER, DR Congo, 30 November 2020.

56 Survey answer by someone who wished to remain anonymous, DR Congo, 26 November 2020.

57 Thin Lei Win, 'Multinational companies account for nearly a fifth of global CO_2 emissions, researchers say,' Reuters, 8 September 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-companies-emissions-trf-idUSKBN25Z1W6.

58 Survey answer by Guichelle Consola Taly, Pan African Climate Justice Alliance, Gabon, 12 November 2020.

59 'Our clients: West African Feeds,' Climate Innovation Centre Ghana, last accessed June 2021, https://www.ghanacic.org/clients/west-african-feeds-2/.

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Former President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, referred to Africa as 'Europe's twin continent',[60] and, as such, the EU has been keen to put money and effort into remaining Africa's biggest partner. All relevant stakeholders need to be involved in policy-making. NGOs, local organisations and grassroot movements play this crucial role in ensuring that the voices of local people, especially those most impacted by the climate crisis, are heard and taken into account.

GENDER JUSTICE: WHY GENDER MATTERS[61]

Climate change exacerbates existing inequalities, of which gender inequality is an important example. Women and other marginalised groups are disproportionately hit by climate change. Research shows that women are fourteen times more likely to die after climate-related natural disasters than men.[62] This is mainly due to the fact that they often have limited access to information and economic resources, limiting their opportunities to act upon disaster warnings. Increasing droughts and flooding caused by climate change also reinforce existing unequal gender roles. Women are often responsible for household tasks, such as gathering firewood, water and securing food. These tasks become more challenging and time-consuming with the effects of climate change, keeping women in and around the household instead of pursuing an education or career.

Gender inequalities can also be seen in the plight of environmental human rights defenders (EHRDs). Women EHRDs face additional violence because of their gender, such as misogynistic attacks, sexual assault or rape, and lack of protection and access to justice. This creates a climate of fear that prevents them from taking action to contribute to fighting climate change and environmental issues, and diminishes opportunities for women to take part in decision-making.

Furthermore, positions of power are often not accessible to women due to pervasive gender norms, discrimination and stereotyping. These inequalities occur on every level, from the local to the global. UN Women reports that 'globally, [...] only 14% of agricultural landholders are women'.[63] If women do not have the rights to the land they work on, they cannot take part in decision-making. Their perspectives on land maintenance and sustainability are lacking.

LAND RIGHTS FOR WOMEN

Case study by Women Engage for a Common Future (WECF)

CFLEDD (Coalition des Femmes Leaders pour l'Environnement et le Développement Durable), one of the partners of WECF in DR Congo, strives for recognition of women's land and forest rights in the provinces of Équateur and Mai-Ndombe. Its aim is to strengthen women's effective participation in reducing deforestation.

Photo © NORAD

In the past, dialogues between local and indigenous women, customary chiefs and provincial authorities have been set up. Recommendations resulting from these dialogues led to the adoption of two provincial edicts that guarantee land and forest rights for women. Local and indigenous women are traditionally in charge of farming in the forest. Recognition of their land rights helps them to actively participate in forest governance, protecting the forest and thereby helping in the fight against climate change. This has transformed the country's patriarchal framework and strengthened the role and decision-making power of women in DRC's forest management policies for climate action.[64]

On a global level, women are also still underrepresented in decision-making on climate issues. For example, 67% of decision-making roles in the international climate policy frameworks of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement are occupied by men.[65] This is problematic because experience and expertise from diverse perspectives present at the decision-making table are needed. Policy solutions should address the needs and concerns of all groups in society. Inclusive processes are essential for achieving sustainable change.

Likewise, when women are not at the decision-making table, gender perspectives are often lacking. This is reflected in gender-blind policies. It also results in reduced access to funding: 'Women are often not involved in the decisions made about the responses to climate change, so the money ends up going to the men rather than the women,' said environmental scientist Diana Liverman on BBC News.[66] Women thus are hit hardest by climate change, while they do not have the means to take action and are excluded from decision-making processes.

A climate-just approach promotes a system change, away from these structural inequalities leading to climate disasters. It recognises the intersectionality of climate and environmental issues: each individual, with their own different social identities, is affected differently by climate change and can bring in their unique experience to find solutions. These differences also need to be recognised when designing climate policies.

> ***"Women are often not involved in the decisions made about the responses to climate change, so the money ends up going to the men rather than the women."***

BRIQUETTES IN UGANDA

Case study by Action for Rural Women's Empowerment (ARUWE)

A large majority of households in rural Uganda depend on firewood and charcoal for cooking. This not only results in high CO_2 emissions, but also strong deforestation. This rate of deforestation increases vulnerability to climate change, especially prolonged droughts and changes in rainfall patterns across the country. This is evident through frequent flooding of rivers in western Uganda, extreme droughts in northern Uganda and landslides in eastern Uganda.

Photo © ARUWE

ARUWE, in cooperation with WECF, works on transitioning local communities to sustainable solutions, away from a dependency on firewood. They facilitate women-led co-operatives to increase the local value chain by producing briquettes.

Carbonised briquettes have been proved to serve as a replacement to natural fuelwood and raw biomass fuel. They offer greater energy per unit weight than wood or raw biomass and in addition they produce less smoke. 'A needs assessment on the communities' energy needs showed us that many would like practical trainings and diversification of renewable energy technologies', Agnes Mirembe from ARUWE states. 'That's why our trainings focus on commercially producing briquettes for renewable energy, specifically directed at women at both cooperative and household levels'. Through these training, more people get access to renewable energy, and it makes women more economically independent at the same time.

60 Benjamin Fox, 'Juncker offers EU-Africa trade deal in new "partnership of equals,"' Euractiv, 12 September 2018, https://www.euractiv.com/section/africa/news/juncker-offers-eu-africa-trade-deal-in-new-partnership-of-equals/.

61 Based on input by Sanne van de Voort and Kirsten Meijer, Women Engage for a Common Future (WECF).

62 Senay Habtezion, *Gender and Disaster Risk Reduction* (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2013), 3, https://www.shareweb.ch/site/DRR/Documents/Related%20Sectors/Governance/UNDP-GenderDRR_2013.pdf.

63 UN Women, *Generation Equality* (New York: UN Women, 2020), 21, https://auth-hq.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2020/gender-equality-womens-rights-in-review-en.pdf?la=en&vs=934.

64 For more information, see 'Winner transformational solutions, ' WECF, last accessed June 2021, https://www.wecf.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/2018-CFLEDD.pdf.

65 UN Women, *Generation Equality*, 21.

66 Mary Halton, 'Climate change 'impacts women more than men,' BBC News, 8 March 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-43294221.

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RIGHTS, REPRESENTATION AND RESOURCES FOR WOMEN

Women and other marginalised groups are hit hardest by climate change. Gender transformative policies are thus crucial. Governments on all levels need to promote gender justice in their climate policies. These kinds of policies recognise the gender-specific inequalities and address them, promoting a change in power relations, societal norms and other causes of gender inequalities. Gender transformative policies also pay specific attention to mobilising underrepresented groups for climate action, addressing the aspects of rights, representation and resources.

With regard to rights, conservative trends around the world put increasing pressure on human rights in general and women's rights specifically. The EU can use its political power to address and support EHRDs.

Furthermore, representation of women and other marginalised groups needs to be improved. A redistribution of power is needed and equal access to resources. The EU can create spaces for women at decision-making tables. Women's voices need to be represented in decision-making spaces related to climate issues, including in climate finance institutions, municipalities, local (energy) cooperatives and economic boards.

In November 2020, the EU introduced the EU Gender Action Plan III.[67] As gender equality is one of the EU's key values, this is an important next step. However, the EU should work on more systematic inclusion of gender equality and women's and girls' rights in the political dialogue with partner countries, including human rights dialogues and social dialogues, but also in technical dialogues where gender analysis and messaging is less commonly used.[68] The EU should, furthermore, track progress in how well gender is mainstreamed in non-development policies such as trade and agriculture.

This chapter illustrated the impact of climate change on the African continent, showcasing that climate change is happening right now and urgent action is needed. It is important that these stories – especially those of marginalised groups, including women – are heard and included in the policy debate. Only then can policies really target what is needed. These groups lack sufficient resources to come into action themselves and are not adequately represented in the fora that come up with solutions to the climate crisis. In the survey, African stakeholders indicated four key sectors where investment is needed: climate-proof agriculture, renewable energy, conservation of ecosystems and water resource management. To include African perspectives in EU policies, we propose the following recommendations:

- The EU needs to invest in a true partnership with the African continent, where its policy processes are transparent and all relevant stakeholders, including the most vulnerable, are included. EU delegations in the countries need the capacity and resources to facilitate this. Civil society organisations in African countries should be invited for policy dialogues and consultations on a structural basis. Furthermore, specific spaces should be created for the voices of groups that are underrepresented in policy dialogues, such as women in all their diversity, and youths.
- The EU and EU delegations in African countries should lead by example and engage in an ambitious implementation of the EU Gender Action Plan III[69] and prioritise protection of women's rights by supporting feminist and women's rights organisations. Support should be structural and flexible, addressing the needs of those groups that are in the frontline to protect these rights. Support should go beyond funding, but also enable a broadening of partnerships and opening up of spaces for civil society organisations to increase accountability of the EU.

67 European Commission, *EU Gender Action Plan III – an ambitious agenda for gender equality and women's empowerment in EU external action*, Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council, JOIN(2020) 17 final, Brussels, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/join-2020-17-final_en.pdf.

68 CONCORD, *Analysis of GAP III*, presented to CODEV, 26 November 2020, https://concordeurope.org/resource/gender-action-plan-iii/.

69 European Commission, *EU Gender Action Plan III*.

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The previous chapter has shown the impact of climate change on Africa. Developing countries in Africa have no historical responsibility for climate change, yet are the most vulnerable to its effects. In the global fight against climate change, the international community has recognised that developed countries have different responsibilities when it comes to taking climate action than developing nations in Africa and elsewhere. This idea is embodied by the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities': while all states are responsible, they are not equally responsible.[70]

On top of their minimal responsibility for climate change, these countries also have limited capacity to deal with climate change. African countries are facing social and economic development challenges which limit their ability to take climate action. Economic development can drive the transition towards climate neutrality, but this takes huge investments.

Because of developing countries' differentiated responsibility and limited capacity, at the COP15 Summit in Copenhagen in 2009 the developed countries pledged to fund mitigation and adaptation in developing countries with $100 billion a year by 2020.[71] This Green Climate Fund was further finalised during the following COPs. The Paris Agreement (December 2015, COP21) reaffirms these climate finance obligations.

Although it reaffirmed the climate finance goal of $100 billion per year, the Paris Agreement has been criticised for being weak on climate justice and human rights.[72] Instead of setting more ambitious collective goals to financially support developing countries, it was agreed to simply extend the existing goal until 2025, after which a new collective goal may be set.[73]

THE PARIS AGREEMENT

The central aim of the Paris Agreement is to keep global warming to a maximum of 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels, and ideally to 1.5°C. Unlike the 1997 Kyoto Protocol – which had established binding targets for developed countries to cut their emissions, causing the United States to not participate – the Paris Agreement emphasises flexibility and consensus-building, with each country presenting its own plan to reduce emissions: the nationally determined contributions (NDCs).

While there is no legal enforcement for the NDCs, countries are legally bound to regularly and transparently report on their progress. In other words: the Paris agreement is non-binding on substance, but binding on reporting. The climate goals are thus politically encouraged, rather than legally bound. All parties are required to submit emissions reduction plans. Because the plans are voluntary, the Paris Agreement emphasises the principle of common but differentiated responsibility and capabilities.[74] This structure has allowed the Paris Agreement to bring a historic number of countries into a common cause: more than 190 countries pledged to cut emissions.

The EU also supports the $100 billion pledge and, together with is member states and the European Investment Bank (EIB), remains the largest providers of public climate finance to developing countries.[75] In 2019, the EU contributed €23.2 billion.[76]

70 This principle is enshrined in the UNFCCC, which entered into force in 1994. The UNFCCC can be seen as the framework for further key international climate treaties: it is the basis for other Protocols and Agreements, which have been negotiated at the yearly COP meetings.

71 International Institute for Sustainable Development, A Brief Analysis of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, (IISD, 2009), https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/enb_copenhagen_commentary.pdf.

72 Richard Widick, 'Climate Justice & Human Rights after the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, 2016-2021,' The *International Institute of Climate Action and Theory*, Projects, 21 June 2019, https://iicat.org/human-rights-and-climate-justice-after-paris-2016-2021.

73 Oxfam International, *Oxfam's initial analysis of the Paris Agreement. What will the Paris Agreement be remembered for?* (*Oxfam*, 2015), https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/oxfams-initial-analysis-paris-agreement.

74 'The Paris Agreement', United Nations Climate Change, Process and meetings, last accessed June 2021, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement.

75 ACT Alliance EU, *Falling Short: Seven ways in which the EU should improve its climate support to developing countries* (ACT Alliance EU, 2020), https://actalliance.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Falling-Short-Seven-ways-in-which-the-EU-could-improve-its-climate-support-to-developing-countries.pdf.

76 'Climate finance: EU and member states' contributions continued to increase in 2019,' Council of the EU, Press Release, 29 October 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/10/29/climate-finance-eu-and-member-states-contributions-continued-to-increase-in-2019/.

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For this policy study, we looked at some of the EU climate finance, namely a part that was spent through the EU's official development assistance (ODA) budget by the EU and the EIB. This is biennially reported to the UNFCCC. We used the report that was published in December 2019, which is the most recent one, and which included the dataset of the projects in 2017 and 2018.[77] Even though public financial support is only one portion of the investments in climate financing, this data does provide a large portion of climate finance that the EU invests in developing countries and gives us a more detailed insight into the specific projects the EU focuses on and budgets available for them. Seeing as official reporting for 2019 and 2020 is not yet available, we cannot assess with certainty whether the presentation of the European Green Deal in 2019 has led to a more integrated and ambitious approach by the EU. Still, this research, in combination with publications and estimates by others, shows that some key issues with climate finance remain and need to be addressed to achieve climate justice.

THE $100 BILLION PLEDGE: A FAILED PROMISE

First of all, the $100 billion pledge has not been met yet. Although donor reports show that there is an upward trend in climate finance from developed countries, as it increased from $52.2 billion in 2013 to $58.6 billion in 2016 to $78.9 billion in 2018, it seems very unlikely that $100 billion had been reached at the end of 2020.[78] To make matters worse, this target is already outdated. The 2016 Adaptation Gap Report by the UN Environment Programme concluded that annual costs of adaptation only in developing countries could range from $140-300 billion annually by 2030, and $280-500 billion by 2050.[79] This far exceeds the current $100 billion target.

Meanwhile, these numbers by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – $78 billion of climate finance in 2018 – are already far too optimistic and are met with scepticism from developing countries, NGOs and academics. The OECD estimates are an overestimation of actual climate finance, due to key issues such as overreporting climate finance, counting loans as climate finance, and the issues that climate finance is not 'new and additional' as was promised. Furthermore, there is also the problem of an adaptation gap, where mitigation is prioritised over adaptation. Finally, climate finance does not always target what is needed. The section below will further discuss these five issues.

CLIMATE FINANCE IS OVERREPORTED

Countries use completely different methods to check whether climate finance is targeting climate objectives and should count towards the $100 billion per year pledge. As a result, the reported climate finance often includes projects without a direct, clear linkage with climate change. In our own analysis of EU climate finance, we found that up to 19% of climate finance expenses, an amount of €547 million, is being spent on projects without a clear climate action objective. Other reports show that the amount of climate finance worldwide is about 30% less than currently reported.[80]

Checking whether a project has a clear climate action objective is made difficult by the lack of available information. Background information on projects in the UNFCCC database, reported by the EU itself, is often hard to find or largely missing. One of the projects in the database was the 'AAP 2018 contribution to the NIP SOUTH', a project of €243 million, which adds up to 17.4% of the total 2018 climate finance investments provided in this database. A project description and background information on these expenses were impossible to find. This kind of information should be consistent, transparent and publicly available.

The problem of overreporting can partially be attributed to the OECD Rio Marker system, where governments can self-categorise their projects as either 'principally' or 'significantly' climate-related.[81] This system is used to specify and measure climate-relevant spending. Many different projects are covered by these scores, and as a result, there is a lot of overreporting of projects that are not solely focused on fighting climate change. Within the UNFCCC dataset we used, there are only two possible indicators: 0% or 100%, which makes the overreporting an even bigger issue. There is little clarity about the degree of climate-relevant investment. This problem applies to other countries reporting on climate finance too.

LOANS ARE COUNTED AS CLIMATE FINANCE

Another problem is the question of how to count climate finance. The Paris Agreement states that climate finance can be mobilised from a 'wide variety of sources, instruments and channels'.[82] Most countries count all financial instruments, including loans, grants and private investments, in their reporting. An estimated 20% of reported public climate finance consists of grants, compared to 80% reported as loans and other non-grant instruments.[83] However, counting loans as climate finance gives a skewed image: a developing country receiving a $50 million loan, for example, may have to repay $60 million or more. These repayments are not counted against the original flows.[84]

This is highly worrying. Many developing countries are already in debt distress, or at high risk of it, a situation that has been worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic. [85] Developing countries have to accept loans to protect themselves from the consequences of GHG emissions they are not responsible for. This underlines the need for fair climate finance. Debt cancellation in general will also contribute to additional means for developing countries to fight the climate emergency and to reach the SDGs.

CLIMATE FINANCE NOT ALWAYS 'NEW AND ADDITIONAL'

Moreover, the Copenhagen Accord (2009) asked for 'new and additional' climate finance, but it remains unclear how additionality should be defined in relation to development budgets and ODA spending. The European Commission, for example, has made finance for climate change part of traditional aid spending. It has increased the share of ODA that is spent on climate action, but without an overall increase of its ODA budget. This way, climate finance cannot be seen as truly 'new and additional' as it does not account for the additional finance that is needed to tackle climate change.

Besides, ODA is intended to be used to assist the poorest countries and poorest communities to develop. EU climate finance is to a large extent spent in upper middle-income countries. The grants allocated by EU institutions to the Least Developed Countries have decreased, while the share going to upper-middle-income countries has increased. In fact, the total amount going to countries within Europe, including Turkey, was higher than the total going to least developed countries.[86] This risks ODA money being diverted from being spent on projects with the biggest development priority.

THE ADAPTATION GAP

As already mentioned above, one of the problems regarding climate finance is the one of overreporting. A particular problem here is that countries seem to overreport their climate spending on adaptation specifically. Donors seem to exaggerate the adaptation components of their projects. A recent study by the international humanitarian organisation CARE even found global climate adaptation finance to be overreported by 42%.[87] Our own analysis of the EU's climate finance shows that about 1 out of 5 projects marked as 'adaptation' does not solely focus on adaptation, and should thus be marked as either 'cross-cutting' or as 'mitigation'.[88] The Paris Agreement, on the other hand, mentioned the aim to 'achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation'.[89]

And even with overreporting, there is still a gap reported between mitigation and adaptation, favouring the former. Only about one-third of EU climate finance went towards

77 'European Union. Fourth biennial reporting common tabular format (BR-CTF). BR-CTF 4,' United Nations Climate Change, 3 April 2020, table 7(b)_2017 and 7(b)_2018, https://unfccc.int/documents/215587.

78 Alina Averchenkova et al., Delivering on the 100 billion climate finance commitment and transforming climate finance (*Independent Expert Group on Climate Finance*, 2020), https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/100_billion_climate_finance_report.pdf. These are the most recent numbers reported by the OECD.

79 United Nations Environment Program, *Adaptation Gap Report 2020* (Nairobi: *UNEP*, 2021), https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2020.

80 Oxfam International, *Climate Finance Shadow Report 2020* (Oxford, Oxfam GB, 2020), 12, https://www.oxfamnovib.nl/Files/rapporten/2020/Climate%20Finance%20Shadow%20Report%20-%20English%20-%20Embargoed%2020%20October%202020.pdf.

81 Hanna Petri, 'Short guide to the use of Rio markers,' European Union, 3 June 2021, https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/public-environment-climate/wiki/short-guide-use-rio-markers.

82 United Nations, *Paris Agreement* (Paris: UN, 2015), Article 9, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf.

83 Oxfam International, *Climate Finance Shadow Report 2020*.

84 J. Timmons Roberts et al., 'Rebooting a failed promise of climate finance,' *Nature Climate Change* 11 (2021): 180-182, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-021-00990-2.

85 Alina Averchenkova et al., *Delivering on the 100 billion climate finance commitment*.

86 ACT Alliance EU, *Falling Short*.

87 'Developed nations hugely exaggerate climate adaptation finance for Global South,' Care, news, 21 January 2021, https://www.care-international.org/news/press-releases/developed-nations-hugely-exaggerate-climate-adaptation-finance-for-global-south.

88 The EU itself reported 58 projects as 'adaptation' in 2017 and 2018 (UNFCCC database). Looking at the description of each project, we concluded that 11 of these projects do not mainly focus on adaptation, and thus should not be identified as such.

89 United Nations, *Paris Agreement*, Article 9.

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adaptation in 2018. [90] Many other studies also signalled an enduring gap in support for adaptation.[91] A major cause of the adaptation gap is that mitigation projects, such as renewable energy projects, generally have a good rate of return, while adaptation projects – such as building sea walls and other infrastructure – are less appealing for a private-sector stakeholder. It is thus especially important that public climate finance focuses on those projects that are not that interesting for the private sector to ensure a balance between adaptation and mitigation. Local governments, in cooperation with civil society and other (grassroots) movements, should have the lead on what this public climate finance should be spent on.

FUNDING DOES NOT MATCH THE IDENTIFIED NEEDS

Including local perspectives is thus crucial. In our research on EU climate finance, we also looked at whether the commitments by the EU match the needs and priorities[92] identified as such by Africans themselves in our survey.[93] In 2017 and 2018, only 30% of the EU ODA-funded climate finance expenses in Africa went to these priorities. This seems rather low, also because other documents by the African Union refer to these priorities as well. The Common Africa Position on the post-2015 Development Agenda already referred to issues as biodiversity management, access to safe water, and addressing land degradation as key commitments in the context of climate change.[94] Besides, within the Global Framework for Climate Services in Africa, the priority areas are agriculture and food security, disaster risk reduction, energy, health, and water.[95] Furthermore, Europe's fragmented system to distribute climate finance creates overlaps and inefficiencies. The EU and its member states have created 'a myriad of initiatives' to promote climate measures on the African continent. The labyrinth of initiatives is difficult to understand from an EU perspective, let alone from an African one.[96]

To improve the efficacy of climate finance, African perspectives must be taken into account. Local communities are the ones impacted by climate change and know best what is needed to deal with it and to help mitigate future climate change. Local communities should be able to identify priorities and take the lead in the decisions that affect them. Although there is a lack of data on how much climate finance is being spent at the local level, the limited data that is available show that it is too modest.[97]

It is vitally important that climate finance reaches the most vulnerable, including women. However, only 2% of all gender transformative climate finance went to grassroots civil society organisations in 2014[98] and Oxfam estimates that only a third of climate finance projects in 2017-18 consider the different needs of women.[99] Obtaining funding often requires political connections and technical skill, which historically marginalised women-led groups – and other marginalised groups – often do not have. While climate financing mechanisms have undertaken efforts to advance the inclusion of women, a 2019 report signals: 'The burden is often still on the women's organisations to adapt to and meet the demands and structures of the financing mechanisms, rather than vice versa.'[100]

Meanwhile, higher-capacity institutions that do obtain funding often lack the local expertise of the on-the-ground situation that grassroots movements have. Donors should make their finance mechanisms more inclusive: the inclusion of women and other underrepresented groups improves the effectiveness, efficiency and impact of climate finance.[101]

This chapter showed that the $100 billion per year climate finance pledge is a failed promise. Even the most optimistic recent numbers show that far too little funding has been mobilised to reach the promised $100 billion. Meanwhile, the available reporting does not represent the true value of climate finance, because the EU (amongst others) overreports the climate relevance of their projects and includes loans in its reporting. Current reporting is not consistent nor transparent. Furthermore, there is also the problem of an adaptation gap, where mitigation is prioritised over adaptation. African perspectives are not being prioritised, and as a result climate finance is not invested where it is most needed. We propose the following recommendations to address these issues with climate finance:

- Small-scale projects implemented by locally-led, community-based organisations, in particular women-led groups, can make the most significant impact, but currently lack the institutional capacity to navigate donor mechanisms. Climate finance donors, including the large climate funds, therefore need to improve their application mechanisms to become more inclusive. This can be done by:
  - reducing bureaucracy, including lowering the minimum amount and not requiring private co-finance;
  - aligning their objectives to the priorities identified by local stakeholders; and
  - using existing local government infrastructures to effectively provide local groups with grants, as well as knowledge-sharing and capacity-building.
- Public climate finance needs to prioritise the most vulnerable countries and communities. Instead of the current concentration on middle-income countries, there should be special focus on developing countries, small island states and women. These countries and groups should also be prioritised in broader climate policies by the EU. To prevent further debt distress among the most vulnerable, public climate finance needs to move away from financing through loans and the EU and its member states should take steps to cancel debts of developing countries.
- At least 50% of public climate finance by the EU and its member states needs to be spent on adaptation measures to create a balance between adaptation and mitigation measures.
- Climate finance by the EU and its member states should be 'new and additional', as promised: it should form an addition to ODA comprising 0.7% of gross national income (GNI). Climate finance cannot come at the expense of much-needed development programmes.
- At COP26 in November 2021, the EU and its member states should push for consistent accounting and reporting standards for all donors (countries, development banks, the private sector and climate funds) that ensure that reporting reflects the real value of climate finance to developing countries.

90 ACT Alliance EU, *Falling Short*.

91 Oxfam International, *Climate Finance Shadow Report*; and, UNEP, *Adaptation Gap Report 2020*.

92 In chapter two of this policy study these four topics were introduced.

93 See annex for more information both on the specific climate finance research, as well as the survey.

94 African Union, *Common Africa position on the post-2015 Development Agenda* (Addis Ababa: African Union, 2014), 18-20, https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/32848-doc-common_african_position.pdf.

95 Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture, African Union Commission, *Draft African strategy on climate change and the Intra-ACP Climate Services Programme*, https://ufa.eumetsat.int/userfiles/file/1035-%20AUC%20-NYAMBE.pdf.

96 Simone Tagliapietra and Georg Zachmann, 'Europe's Green Deal must reach beyond its borders,' Bruegel, 23 June2021, https://www.bruegel.org/2020/02/europes-green-deal-must-reach-beyond-its-borders/.

97 Oxfam International, *Climate Finance Shadow Report*, 23.

98 'Making climate finance work for women: Overview of bilateral ODA to gender and climate change,' OECD, Environment, last accessed June 2021, https://www.oecd.org/environment/making-climate-finance-work-for-women.htm.

99 Oxfam International, *Climate Finance Shadow Report*.

100 Laura Cooper Hall, Margaux Granat and Tara Daniel, *Women's organizations and climate finance: Engaging in processes and accessing resources*, (Women's Environment and Development Organization, 2019), 8, https://wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/WomensOrgsClimateFinance_EngaginginProcesses.pdf.

101 Linda Adams et al., *Making climate finance work for women* (Asian Development Bank, 2014), https://www.adb.org/publications/making-climate-finance-work-women.

AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES IN THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL

Climate finance is one important tool of the EU to support developing countries in their fight against climate change. But there is more. Currently, the EU is in the process of updating its relationship with African countries. In March 2020 the European Commission put forward the communication *Towards a comprehensive strategy with Africa*.[102] This is the starting point for EU-Africa relations that must move beyond the donor-recipient dynamic. It acknowledges the need for EU and Africa to cooperate as equals, empowering African nations to attain the SDGs, curb climate change, and foster gender equality, among other targets.[103]

The new relationship between the EU and Africa was supposed to be concluded at the AU-EU Summit in 2020. Due to COVID-19 it has been postponed several times and is now scheduled for the first half of 2022. In the strategy the EU claims to prioritise its relations with Africa and wants to strengthen the resilience and independence of its African partners. This chapter looks at the EU's internal climate policies. Even though these policies are internal, they often have impact elsewhere and they should thus also take stock of the mutual interests, shared responsibilities and local realities.

EUROPEAN CLIMATE POLICIES

EU member states are parties to the UNFCCC and they are committed to the Paris Climate Agreement. The EU also implements its own climate strategies. These policies mainly target the stabilisation of GHG emissions, the promotion of renewable energy resources, and improving energy efficiency.

In 2003, the EU introduced its emissions trading system, a cornerstone of its policy to reduce GHG emissions. It was the world's first major carbon market and still remains the biggest one today. In 2007, member states agreed on a set of three targets, the '20-20-20 by 2020' targets[104]: a target to cut GHG emission by 20%, to have a 20% share of EU energy from renewables, and a 20% improvement in energy efficiency, all by 2020. In 2014, the European Commission proposed higher targets for 2030, increasing the targets to 40%, 32% and 32.5% respectively. Latest reporting suggests that the EU is likely to achieve two of the three 2020 targets, namely reducing GHG emissions and boosting renewable energy. The third target, reducing energy consumption, is unlikely to have been achieved.[105]

In 2019, the new European Commission – the Von der Leyen Commission – showed even more ambition. In December 2019, European Commission Executive Vice President Frans Timmermans presented the European Green Deal[106]: 'an ambitious package of measures ranging from ambitiously cutting GHG emissions, to investing in cutting-edge research and innovation, to preserving Europe's natural environment'.[107] The key goal of the European Green Deal is for Europe to become the world's first climate-neutral continent by 2050. The goals set out in the European Green Deal are now legally binding with the Commission's proposal for the first European Climate Law.[108]

THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL

The European Green Deal is a commitment in which EU institutions and member states are legally bound to take measures to reach net zero GHG emissions by 2050.

102 European Commission, *Towards a comprehensive strategy with Africa*, Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council, JOIN(2020) 4 final, Brussels, 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020JC0004&from=FR.

103 'Empowering Africa: MEPs vote on strategy for a new EU-Africa partnership,' European Parliament, press releases, 28 January 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20210122IPR96230/empowering-africa-meps-vote-on-strategy-for-a-new-eu-africa-partnership.

104 '2020 climate & energy package,' European Commission, climate action, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2020_en.

105 'EU on track to meet greenhouse gas emissions in renewable energy 2020 targets, progress in 2019 shows more ambitious long-term objectives are reachable,' European Environment Agency, news, 30 November 2020, https://www.eea.europa.eu/highlights/eu-on-track-to-meet.

106 European Commission, *The European Green Deal*, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2019) 640 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:b828d165-1c22-11ea-8c1f-01aa75ed71a1.0002.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.

107 'EU climate action and the European Green Deal,' European Commission, climate action, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/eu-climate-action_en.

108 The European Parliament and the Council reached a provisional agreement on the Climate Law in April 2021. The file is now being prepared for formal adoption.

In July 2021 the Commission tabled the 'Fit for 55' package[109] to reduce emissions by at least 55% by 2030. The Fit for 55 package is one of the key elements on how the European Green Deal should be realised. However, coal-reliant European countries are resisting ambitious measures due to economic concerns about jobs and competitiveness.[110]

Unfortunately, international ecological implications of the green transition are not sufficiently addressed in the European Green Deal. For example, the mobility strategy, which is part of the Green Deal, gives particular attention to the electrification of road transport. By 2030, the European Commission wants at least 30 million zero-emission cars on Europe's roads, but underestimates some of the socio-ecological implications this may have elsewhere on the planet. The batteries in electric vehicles are produced with minerals sourced in a limited number of countries such as Congo, where human rights are violated in the process, including the use of child labour.[111] Furthermore, mining practices go hand in hand with environmental impacts such as soil erosion, contamination and the loss of biodiversity.[112] A more coherent European policy based on the balanced consideration of economic, environmental and social aspects could ensure sustainable development of the mining industry.[113]

In addition, the Green Deal has a protectionist angle: it uses a carbon tariff[114] to defend the European market from environmentally unfriendly products. This is expected to damage Africa, as the continent's developing industry is often unable to meet high environmental standards. Even if the carbon tariff is safeguarded against formal objections such as rules by the World Trade Organisation, trade partners might still perceive it as overreach.[115] The Green Deal also heavily subsidises the European private sector with its Sustainable Europe Investment Plan. Together with subsidies in the agricultural sector, such investment subsidies are likely to further strain Africa's exports.[116]

TRANSITION TO CIRCULARITY

One of the main blocks of the European Green Deal is the Circular Economy Action Plan, which aims to ensure that waste and pollution are limited and that resources used are kept in the EU economy for as long as possible through initiatives throughout the entire life cycle of products.[117] The 2017 AU-EU declaration already included a commitment to jointly invest public and private capital towards the circular economy.[118] Ghana, Kenya and South Africa have since adopted circular economy practices. A circular approach is expected to bring about benefits for the environment and the economy, by creating jobs and bringing better value to existing jobs such as waste sorting.

However, there are also significant implications of the new circular model for African countries that should not be overlooked. In today's globalised world, consumer goods such as mobile phones are generally composed of resources and materials from developing countries, for example aluminium from Guinea. A European-wide move towards circularity, which does not

109 See: 'Fit for 55 package under the European Green Deal,' European Parliament, Legislative train schedule, last accessed June 20201, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-european-green-deal/package-fit-for-55.

110 Kalina Oroschakoff and Aitor Hernández -Morales, 'EU climate law sparks political battles,' Politico, 3 March 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-climate-law-sparks-political-battles/.

111 Douglas Broom, 'The dirty secret of electric vehicles,' World Economic Forum, 27 March 2019, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/03/the-dirty-secret-of-electric-vehicles/.

112 ActionAid, *Human rights in wind turbine supply chains. Towards a truly sustainable energy transition* (Amsterdam: ActionAid, 2018), 11, https://actionaid.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/83827_ActionAid_RapportWindmolens_FINAL.pdf.

113 Some of these issues will be addressed in the proposed Sustainable Batteries proposal, see https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/green-deal-sustainable-batteries-circular-and-climate-neutral-economy.

114 The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.

115 Mark Leonard et al., *The Geopolitics of the European Green Deal* (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2021), https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-geopolitics-of-the-european-green-deal/.

116 Carlos Lopes, 'Europe and Africa need to see eye to eye on climate change,' OECD, 4 January 2021, https://oecd-development-matters.org/2021/01/04/europe-and-africa-need-to-see-eye-to-eye-on-climate-change/.

117 'First circular economy action plan,' European Commission, circular economy, last accessed June 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/environment/circular-economy/.

118 'Investing in youth for accelerated inclusive growth and sustainable development,' Joint declaration 5th AU-EU Summit, 29-30 November 2017, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31991/33454-pr-final_declaration_au_eu_summit.pdf.

take the concept of climate justice into account, could result in reduced revenues and reduced economic stability for resource-exporting developing countries. Recent critical analysis of the EU's discourse around circularity has shown that EU policies remain focused on 'end of pipe'-solutions at the end of production chains, and policies do not address the many socio-ecological implications of a circularity transition.[119] Commodity-reliant countries in Africa therefore will be required to diversify their exports more and comply with increasingly stringent circular economy-related standards.

Of course, those countries will benefit in the long term from being able to produce sustainably and adapt to market changes. Yet, countries need to be able to plan for the move to a circular economy. EU circularity proposals should therefore contain clear targets and concrete proposals. Without clear planning, the EU Circular Economy package could cause economic instability in African countries and harm vulnerable communities if local perspectives are not taken into account. An effective circular economy needs to be global in scale, and therefore special efforts needs to be made by the EU to help vulnerable communities leverage opportunities and address challenges. Climate-just solutions ensure that no one is left behind. This can be done through investment, trade relations and agreed increased cooperation. Clarity in planning, robust standards and specific language are also key. The potential of such partnerships deserves to receive significant attention at the next joint AU-EU Summit.

CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM

The EU carbon market forces industry within Europe to buy permits when they emit GHGs. With planned reforms to the EU carbon market, the price of those permits is expected to rise. It intends to make emitting GHGs expensive, and reducing GHG emissions more attractive. However, this also brings the risk of 'carbon leakage': if carbon pricing is reformed in the EU, industry might relocate to countries outside of the EU, with less rigorous environmental standards. This would not cut GHG emissions – they would simply be emitted elsewhere in the world.

As a part of the 2021 Fit for 55 package the European Commission therefore proposed a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) for selected sectors.[120] The CBAM aims to address 'carbon leakage' by putting a price on a selected number of imported products that reflect the emissions their production has caused in third countries. Carbon pricing puts an explicit price on GHG emissions and in this way would be in correspondence with the 'polluter pays' principle.[121] A large chunk of emissions caused by consumption in Europe is produced elsewhere, so the EU climate footprint needs to be accounted for more clearly.[122] Ultimately, this stimulates industries everywhere to invest in sustainable production and levels the playing field between EU products, where carbon pricing is included, and non-EU products, where carbon pricing will be included through CBAM.

CBAM is politically complex because it extends the EU's climate policy beyond its own borders. Many see CBAM as a protectionist measure and many questions have been raised about how it would be implemented. CBAM is viewed as a 'stick' to incentivise non-EU countries to raise their climate ambitions and to develop their own carbon pricing mechanism. Some developing countries consider this harmful, especially those that are reliant on carbon-intensive exports. It is estimated that up to $16 billion of developing country exports to the EU could face an additional charge, while most developing countries currently have tariff and quota free access to the EU market.[123] Plans to include electricity in CBAM would mean the energy used for production is included, making it difficult for African countries: their energy mix is predominantly fossil-based. All the while, CBAM would not account for the fact that African countries contribute much less to global emissions – emissions from developing countries account for a small proportion of EU demand – or take into consideration the extent of their policies on sustainability.

It is not certain that such policy measures are actually in line with the 'common but differentiated responsibility' principle of the international climate regime. Elevating product standards could be put forward as an alternative.[124] However, it seems that there is more political support currently for a CBAM.

For the EU to really become a 'global advocate for fairness'[125], the specific role of developing countries should sufficiently be taken into account. It is probable that developing countries need financial as well as technical support to implement measures to decarbonise their production. The introduction of CBAM should thus be complemented with a wide range of supporting measures for these countries. The positive end is if the EU can better shape trade, development and environmental policy on a global level, however in order to do this it will need to cooperate with partners and pay attention to developing countries or it risks slowing climate action down within its own borders and on the global level too. The EU needs to be conscious of the international impact of its own policies as well, and be an example for other interested parties as to how to implement a fair green transition.

> *"The final design of the CBAM and the Circular Economy Action Plan should take into account the effects on developing countries."*

This chapter has shown that the European Green Deal does not take concepts of climate justice sufficiently into account, as the green transition, the CBAM and the circular model have many economic, social and ecological implications for African countries that are not addressed by the EU. The upcoming joint AU-EU Summit should be taken as an opportunity to increase cooperation and establish a partnership of equals. To do so, we propose the following recommendations:

- Climate justice needs to become a guiding principle in the European Green Deal. The international context should be taken into account in all policies and EU law resulting from the Green Deal. The impact assessment framework should be used to ensure that policies do not come at the expense of other goals and commitments. Climate action should safeguard human rights and social and economic resilience everywhere in the world.
- Specifically, the final design of the CBAM and the Circular Economy Action Plan should take into account the effects on developing economies. Introduction should be made conditional on the implementation of a wide range of supporting measures for developing countries to prevent any negative impacts for them.
- Considering that the Joint Communication *Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa*[126] was drawn up in a unilateral manner, leaving both civil society and African leaders only a reactive role, it is crucial that the priorities and concrete actions of the future strategy are discussed in an open manner with all actors through an open consultation.

119 Martin Calisto Friant, Walter Vermeulen and Roberta Salomone, 'Analysing European Union circular economy policies: words versus actions,' *Sustainable Production and Consumption* 27 (2020), 337-353, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352550920313750.

120 European Commission, *Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism*, COM(2021) 564 final, Brussels, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/carbon_border_adjustment_mechanism_0.pdf.

121 Cécile Remeur, *Carbon emission pricing. Some points of reference,* European Parliament Briefing, PE 649.352, March 2020, 3, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/649352/EPRS_BRI(2020)649352_EN.pdf.

122 Eline Blot et al., *Making trade work for EU climate policy* (Brussels: IEEP, 2020), 1, https://ieep.eu/publications/making-trade-work-for-eu-climate-policy-carbon-border-adjustment-or-product-standards.

123 Sam Lowe, *The EU's carbon border adjustment mechanism* (Centre for European Reform, 2021, https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2021/eus-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism-how-make-it-work.

124 Blot et al., *Making trade work for EU climate policy*, 5.

125 'State of the union address by President von der Leyen at the European Parliament plenary,' European Commission, 16 September 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_20_1655.

126 European Commission, *Towards a comprehensive strategy with Africa*.

PROMOTING CLIMATE ACTION THROUGH POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT

The previous chapter already showed that successful climate action is about more than just climate policies and finance. Other EU policies can hinder, or support, climate action and African countries' ability to deal with climate change. Policies focusing on major issues such as trade and agriculture have to be brought in line with climate policies and commitments to development. Furthermore, the international dimension and effects are not prioritised within EU policies. Policy coherence for (sustainable) development (PCD) can be seen as a framework to improve this, aiming to prevent negative side effects across policies and promote positive synergies to the benefit of (sustainable) development policies and objectives.[127]

THE EU'S COMMITMENT TO POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT

Both the Paris Agreement and the Agenda 2030 with the 17 underlying SDGs stress the need for coherent policies across sectors. In the Lisbon Treaty, signed in 2007, PCD became a legal obligation for the EU and its member states, meaning that in all relevant policies that are being implemented, the EU and its member states need to take into account the objectives of development cooperation. Climate change is one of the key areas for the EU in this regard, being one of the five traditional strategic challenges. This is further underlined in the 2017 *European consensus on development*.[128] Climate change has the ability to hinder the realisation of all SDGs, so addressing climate change is the crucial step to positively impact the realisation of these global goals. The EU commits itself, once again, to fighting the consequences of climate change, both in the EU and globally.

One of the most obvious policy incoherencies with a huge impact on African development is that of tax avoidance. Developing countries lose around $200 billion per year in revenues due to tax avoidance by multinational companies.[129] European tax havens such as the Netherlands, Ireland and Luxembourg play a significant role in this. Their tax policies allow multinationals to shift profits to European countries and pay much less tax in those countries where the company is actually active (in for example Africa). In the case of the Netherlands the amount of loss of tax revenues in developing countries equals almost 40% of the Dutch ODA budget.[130] The loss of revenues worsens the already weak adaptive capacities of developing countries to climate change.

TRADE POLICY AS LINK BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DIMENSION

With its trade policy, the EU links the internal dimension with the external one. The discussion on CBAM above[131] shows, for example, how internal climate policies have an external impact through carbon leakage and how trade is used in this regard. Special focus should therefore be paid to the effects of EU trade. Trade strategies should go beyond maximising economic gains for EU businesses by supporting the environment and human rights, or at least making sure not to harm them. In its new Trade Strategy[132] the EU confirms it will use its trade relationships with African countries to support development, showing the interlinkage between the two. The strategy also promises to support the green transition through trade by a framework that bolsters the sustainability and resilience of the EU's supply chain and targets the sustainability of goods sold on the EU market.[133] There is a greater need for synergies between the EU's internal and external policies shaping trade, but the strategy does not identify any concrete actions for achieving this.

Being a global standard-setter, a community of values and a key actor and market in global trade, the EU needs to ensure the uptake of standards within its trade strategies in coherence with the EU's development cooperation agenda. Green and social standards should be at the basis of new trade deals. In practice, this is not necessarily the case. The EU-Mercosur trade deal, for example, threatens to wreck EU's leadership on climate: 'Its trade and sustainable development chapter – the principle means of addressing environmental and social concerns – lacks both clear commitments and means of enforcement'.[134]

EU-MERCOSUR TRADE DEAL

In June 2019, the EU and Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) reached a political agreement for the EU-Mercosur trade agreement after twenty years of negotiation. The final texts have not yet been finalised, signed or ratified. The trade agreement gets a lot of criticism, also from environmental activists. While the EU and Mercosur emphasise their commitment to the Paris Climate Agreement referencing the sustainable development chapter of the agreement, this chapter lacks clear commitments and means of enforcement.[135]

This is unfortunate, especially since the EU is pushing for a strong environment agenda at the World Trade Organisation.[136] The new EU Trade Strategy also notes that adherence to the Paris Agreement is essential in trade agreements with third countries. A better example is the trade agreement with the United Kingdom. This agreement affirms the ambition of both sides to achieve climate neutrality by 2050, and it includes means of enforcement: immediate tariff consequences – or even suspension or termination of the agreement – when insufficient action is taken to reach the neutrality target. Climate, as a make or break issue, should provide the baseline standard for all agreements to be concluded, including EU-Mercosur.[137]

Another component that is often referred to is the impact of EU multinationals and our consumption patterns. Private sector finance is an important part of climate finance. However, the role of multinationals can be questionable at times, especially with respect to their climate change impact. In Kenya, roses are produced for export, and about one third of the roses sold in the EU are from this country.[138] Production of these roses involves extensive water usage, while it is often located in areas where the water supply is limited. High intensification also has a negative impact on the environment and, in addition, the economic profit does not usually benefit the local population. In Tunisia, with the support of the EU, a large part of the agricultural sector is focused on the production of olives. This monoculture has negative impacts on the biodiversity in the country. On top of that, the country does not produce enough grain crops anymore and therefore has to import wheat. The Arab Spring started late 2010 in Tunisia because of high prices of wheat.

A survey respondent in Tanzania explained how an international company active in his country fails to stimulate recycling measures, with a huge impact on waste in the country.[139] Binding measures for corporate due diligence and corporate accountability are crucial in this regard, the last 30 years have shown that voluntary agreements and market regulations do not suffice. When EU-based companies behave socially and sustainably throughout their chains, also within African countries, their contribution to sustainable development could become much more positive than it now is.

THE FOSSIL ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM

Moreover, there is a continuous flow of financial support by European countries for the fossil fuel industry – the biggest contributor to climate change – which stands in the way of effective climate action, and sabotages the EU's climate goals and green leadership aspirations.

127 'Policy Coherence for Development,' ECDPM, topics, last accessed June 2021, https://ecdpm.org/topics/policy-coherence-development/#:~:text=Policy%20Coherence%20for%20Development%20aims,the%201992%20Treaty%20of%20Maastricht.

128 European Commission, *The new European consensus on development 'our world, our dignity, our future'* (Luxembourg: European Commission, 2018), https://op.europa.eu/nl/publication-detail/-/publication/5a95e892-ec76-11e8-b690-01aa75ed71a1.

129 ActionAid, *Tax in times of corona: the impact of tax avoidance via the Netherlands on developing countries' capacity to combat COVID-19* (Amsterdam: ActionAid, 2020), 5, https://actionaid.nl/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/ActionAid_TaxinTimesofCorona_final.pdf.

130 ActionAid, *Tax in times of corona*, 6.

131 See chapter 4 for more on the discussion on CBAM.

132 European Commission, *Trade Policy Review. An open, sustainable and assertive trade policy*, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2021) 66 final, Brussels, 2021, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2021/february/tradoc_159438.pdf.

133 'Trade policy review: How green is the future of EU trade?,' Institute for European Environmental Policy, 4 March 2021, https://ieep.eu/news/trade-policy-review-how-green-is-the-future-of-eu-trade.

134 Ana Toni and Laurence Tubiana, 'Mercosur trade deal threatens to wreck EU's climate credibility,' *Euractiv*, 2 April 2021, https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/opinion/eu-mercosur-trade-deal-threatens-to-wreck-the-blocs-climate-credibility/.

135 'EU and Mercosur reach agreement on trade', European Commission, news archive, 28 June 2019, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2039.

136 Elena Sánchez Nicholás, 'EU pushes WTO reform and Paris agenda in new trade plan,' *EUobserver*, 19 February 2021, https://euobserver.com/green-deal/150981.

137 Toni and Tubiana, 'Mercosur trade deal threatens to wreck EU's climate credibility.'

138 Jez Fredenburgh, 'Made on earth. The 4,000 mile flower delivery', *BBC*, consulted May 2021, https://www.bbc.com/future/bespoke/made-on-earth/the-new-roots-of-the-flower-trade/.

139 Survey answer by someone who wished to remain anonymous, Tanzania, 13 November 2020.

PROMOTING CLIMATE ACTION THROUGH POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT

The fossil fuel sector continues to be the biggest contributor to climate change. European governments financially facilitate this industry in many forms, such as tax breaks for aviation and free licenses for large emitters in the Emission Trading System. Investigate Europe has shown that this support adds up to more than €137 billion per year.[140] In 2019, all EU member states were expected to put forward an inventory of existing subsidies for the fossil fuel industry and a plan to phase them out in their National Energy and Climate Plan. Sixteen member states provided an incomplete list and none of the countries showed a clear plan to phase out subsidies.[141] Unclear definitions were at the basis of this. Member states were able to choose their own definition of fossil fuel subsidies. Many did, for example, not take into account tax exemptions such as for the use of coal in electricity production or funding of projects abroad through export credit insurance.

According to the report *The fossil elephant in the room*[142] by the Dutch NGO Both ENDS, the government-backed loans, guarantees and insurance issued via export credit agencies (ECAs) provide the largest pool of global public support to the fossil fuel sector. Together, the ECAs of G20 countries provided an annual amount of €35 billion in support to fossil fuel production between 2013 and 2015.[143] Atradius DSB, the Dutch ECA, insured fossil fuel-related projects with a total maximum insured value of €7.3 billion between 2012 and 2015, two-thirds of its total insured value for that period and 36 times more than its support for clean energy.[144] This support more than nullifies the impacts of the same government's investments in climate finance.

WAY FORWARD

Policy coherence is not easy to realise, it needs a paradigm shift that is a matter of political decision-making. The 17 SDGs can provide a compass by which policies can be shaped in such a way as to achieve sustainable development while at the same time reducing vulnerability to climate change. This would call for the creation of development policies that realise economic, social, local and global environmental goals at the same time. But this cannot be addressed through development actions in isolation; all relevant domestic and international policies have to be coherent with international sustainable development and climate actions, even if the initial focus is on national (or European) issues, and the private sector has to be acting accordingly too.

On top of that, we need to ensure preventing the creation of gender-blind policies in this regard. While the EU is committed to achieving gender equality, a gender perspective is lacking in EU climate policy making. Gender-related aims are usually treated as separate issues, in specific gender action plans or strategies. Being committed to achieving gender equality also means promoting it in climate policies, therefore gender analysis should be part of all EU policies.

To ensure that local perspectives can be heard, it is important that in the partner countries sufficient space for civil society organisations is available. The EU should support good governance initiatives at the local level for sustainable development to actually be inclusive and sustainable. Local solutions are key for development and climate action, with important attention to economic opportunities, awareness and information. Young people carry the future and should be enabled to impact policies. Civil society organisations (CSOs) need to be given space to fulfil their roles as watchdogs and help in awareness raising for local communities. Improved knowledge exchange between Europe and Africa might be a good step towards achieving this.

This chapter showed the EU's commitment towards policy coherence for development. To meet it, the EU should prevent negative side effects across its policies and promote positive synergies for the benefit of sustainable development policies and objectives. With its trade policy, the EU links its internal with the external dimension. To uphold its PCD commitment, policies that focus on major issues such as trade have to be brought in line with climate goals and EU's development objectives. This would require a paradigm shift that is a matter of political decision-making. The SDGs can be used as a framework to enhance coherence in international and national policy-making. We propose the following recommendations:

- To achieve climate justice, all EU policies, even policies that focus solely on internal issues, should be coherent with its development objectives and the objectives agreed upon internationally such as the Paris climate goals and the SDGs. Therefore, it should be mandatory for each new initiative to check in advance the expected impact on developing countries, and on the realisation of the climate goals and the SDGs. When an initiative does not pass, it should be revised or withdrawn

- The EU trade strategy needs to recognise a greater need for synergies between the EU's internal and external policies shaping trade, with concrete actions for achieving this. Trade policies and trade agreements should include sustainable development and climate objectives so that the agreements contribute to the fight against climate change and benefit development. These objectives must be equally as enforceable as the rest of the agreement.

- EU member states should strive for ambitious due diligence legislation on both the national and European level to ensure that European companies do not neglect or even profit from human rights abuses, environmental destruction and climate breakdown. Companies should be required, by law, to conduct due diligence throughout their entire value chains to prevent and mitigate harmful human rights and environmental impact. Furthermore, the EU should support a binding UN treaty on Business and Human Rights.

- The EU and its member states need to take action to fulfil their commitment towards policy coherence for development. Some concrete steps that should be taken are:

  - To fight tax avoidance, MNCs should pay their fair share of taxes in the countries of production. The new Africa strategy must include concrete measures that would enable significant progress in increasing African countries' domestic resource mobilisation and avoidance of tax reduction via EU member states.
  - The EU and its member states need to immediately terminate their support for fossil fuels and deforestation through subsidies, export credit insurances and other (indirect) forms of support.
  - The EU should address the issue of shrinking space for civil society organisations in partner countries. EU delegations in African countries need to ensure that local CSOs have a seat at the table to provide input. This may also encourage national governments to learn from these inclusive processes and institutionalise them. Moreover, the EU should ensure sufficient funding is available to support CSOs in African countries.

140 Juliet Ferguson, '*Europe's love affair with fossil fuels,*' Investigate Europe, 13 July 2020, https://www.investigate-europe.eu/en/2020/europes-love-affair-with-fossil-fuels/.

141 Ferguson, '*Europe's love affair with fossil fuels.*'

142 Both ENDS, *The fossil elephant in the room* (Amsterdam: Both ENDS, 2019), https://www.bothends.org/uploaded_files/document/The_fossil_elephant_in_the_room_web.pdf.

143 Both ENDS, *The fossil elephant in the room*, 4.

144 Both ENDS, *The fossil elephant in the room*, 14.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Climate change is the biggest challenge we face in the world today, with severe impact – especially on the African continent. In this policy study, we recounted some of these stories. From Appoline in South Kivu, DR Congo, who sees the impact of a changing climate on the production of cassava and maize, two dominant food crops. Lindiwe, a local vegetable vendor, cooks her vegetables using electricity because that is better for her health, but due to droughts, the electricity supply from hydropower is very unreliable. So she has to do all her cooking at night. These are just two examples showing the impact of climate change on the daily lives of people.

Climate change is ultimately a distribution issue, and therefore a deeply political one. Through climate-just actions and policies the needs of the climate-vulnerable poor will be heard, causing the distribution of wealth, power, and the access to decision-making to be more equal.

But those who are impacted most by climate change, including the most vulnerable communities and specifically the younger generation and women, often lack the capabilities to come into action themselves as well as lacking access to decision-making. How then can the EU and its member states ensure climate-just action that targets the needs of those most vulnerable to the climate emergency in Africa, the continent that is expected to suffer disproportionately from climate change?

The first crucial step is to **include African perspectives in all steps of policy-making**. The EU needs to be transparent about its policy process and structurally include a variety of stakeholders, including local NGOs and grassroots movements from African countries, in all policies that might impact them. They need to be structurally invited to policy dialogues and consultations. EU delegations in the countries need to receive the capacity and resources to facilitate this, with a specific focus on underrepresented groups such as women and youth. Including these voices will ensure that needs of Africans will be heard and included. Our survey in this policy study already showed the need for investments in climate proof agriculture, renewable energy, conservation of ecosystems, and water resource management. These are some areas the EU should increase its investments in.

Climate just action also means that those who are hurt most by climate change need the capabilities to deal with this. Adopting an economic growth path that is sustainable, can be very costly and might hinder development, at least in the short term. Climate finance is the key instrument to support this. There are however some issues with climate finance that need to be addressed. As private finance tends to focus on projects with good rates of return, **public climate finance needs to prioritise the most vulnerable countries and communities, focus on adaptation measures and finance mechanisms need to be more inclusive for locally-led projects**, including projects led by women groups.

There can, however, be no justice without a major increase in ambition.[145] With the European Green Deal the EU takes a bold step aiming to be the first climate-neutral continent by 2050. For Executive Vice President of the European Commission Frans Timmermans this is the cornerstone for a green recovery: 'The Green Deal is not a luxury that we drop when we hit another crisis. It is essential for Europe's future.'[146] A green recovery is also essential for Africa's future. Therefore, it is crucial that climate justice becomes a guiding principle in the Green Deal and the European Climate Law, **preventing negative externalities of these policies on countries in Africa**. These negative externalities should also be prevented in all other EU policies. The EU and its member states have committed themselves to the 2030 Agenda with its 17 SDGs and the Paris Climate Agreement. **All EU policies should be coherent with its development objectives, the SDGs and the Paris climate goals**, as all policies can have an impact on Africa's ability to deal with the climate crisis.

Climate change is happening right now. Political choices need to be made and justice needs to be put at the centre of those decisions. Tackling climate change is also about who has the means to decide on climate policies and who has the power to come into action. African countries and key stakeholders need to be included in these key policy moments. With COP26 scheduled for November 2021, and the AU-EU Summit for the first half of 2022, now is the time for action.

145 Foundation for European Progressive Studies, *UNited for Climate Justice. Executive summary* (Brussels: FEPS, 2019), https://www.feps-europe.eu/attachments/publications/united%20for%20climate%20justice%20-%20declaration%20pp.pdf.

146 Florence Schulz, 'Timmermans promises green recovery to EU lawmakers,' *Euractiv*, 22 April 2020, https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/timmermans-promises-green-recovery-to-eu-lawmakers/.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Weaving insights and recommendations from all previous chapters, below are all the recommendations that can substantiate action for climate-just policies by the EU that do include African perspectives.

On including African perspectives:

- The EU needs to invest in a true partnership with the African continent, where its policy processes are transparent and all relevant stakeholders, including the most vulnerable, are included. EU delegations in the countries need the capacity and resources to facilitate this. Civil society organisations in African countries should be invited for policy dialogues and consultations on a structural basis. Furthermore, specific spaces should be created for the voices of groups that are underrepresented in policy dialogues, such as women in all their diversity, and youths.

- The EU and EU delegations in African countries should lead by example and engage in an ambitious implementation of the EU Gender Action Plan III[147] and prioritise protection of women's rights by supporting feminist and women's rights organisations. Support should be structural and flexible, addressing the needs of those groups that are in the frontline to protect these rights. Support should go beyond funding, but also enable a broadening of partnerships and opening up of spaces for civil society organisations to increase accountability of the EU.

- Considering that the Joint Communication *Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa*[148] was drawn up in a unilateral manner, leaving both civil society and African leaders only a reactive role, it is crucial that the priorities and concrete actions of the future strategy are discussed in an open manner with all actors through an open consultation.

On climate finance:

· Small-scale projects implemented by locally-led, community-based organisations, in particular women-led groups, can make the most significant impact, but currently lack the institutional capacity to navigate donor mechanisms. Climate finance donors, including the large climate funds, therefore need to improve their application mechanisms to become more inclusive. This can be done by:

  - reducing bureaucracy, including lowering the minimum amount and not requiring private co-finance;
  - aligning their objectives to the priorities identified by local stakeholders; and
  - using existing local government infrastructures to effectively provide local groups with grants, as well as knowledge-sharing and capacity-building.

- Public climate finance needs to prioritise the most vulnerable countries and communities. Instead of the current concentration on middle-income countries, there should be special focus on developing countries, small island states and women. These countries and groups should also be prioritised in broader climate policies by the EU. To prevent further debt distress among the most vulnerable, public climate finance needs to move away from financing through loans and the EU and its member states should take steps to cancel debts of developing countries.

- At least 50% of public climate finance by the EU and its member states needs to be spent on adaptation measures to create a balance between adaptation and mitigation measures.

- Climate finance by the EU and its member states should be 'new and additional', as promised: it should form an addition to ODA comprising 0.7% of GNI. Climate finance cannot come at the expense of much-needed development programmes.

- At COP26 in November 2021, the EU and its member states should push for consistent accounting and reporting standards for all donors (countries, development banks, the private sector and climate funds) that ensure that reporting reflects the real value of climate finance to developing countries.

147 European Commission, *EU Gender Action Plan III*.

148 European Commission, *Towards a comprehensive strategy with Africa*.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

On policy coherence for development and climate justice in the European Green Deal

- To achieve climate justice, all EU policies, even policies that focus solely on internal issues, should be coherent with its development objectives and the objectives agreed upon internationally such as the Paris climate goals and the SDGs. Therefore, it should be mandatory for each new initiative to check in advance the expected impact on developing countries, and on the realisation of the climate goals and the SDGs. When an initiative does not pass, it should be revised or withdrawn.

- The EU trade strategy needs to recognise a greater need for synergies between the EU's internal and external policies shaping trade, with concrete actions for achieving this. Trade policies and trade agreements should include sustainable development and climate objectives so that the agreements contribute to the fight against climate change and benefit development. These objectives must be equally as enforceable as the rest of the agreement.

- EU member states should strive for ambitious due diligence legislation on both the national and European level to ensure that European companies do not neglect or even profit from human rights abuses, environmental destruction and climate breakdown. Companies should be required, by law, to conduct due diligence throughout their entire value chains to prevent and mitigate harmful human rights and environmental impact. Furthermore, the EU should support a binding UN treaty on Business and Human Rights.

- The EU and its member states need to take action to fulfil their commitment towards policy coherence for development. Some concrete steps that should be taken are:

  - To fight tax avoidance, MNCs should pay their fair share of taxes in the countries of production. The new Africa strategy must include concrete measures that would enable significant progress in increasing African countries' domestic resource mobilisation and avoidance of tax reduction via EU member states.
  - The EU and its member states need to immediately terminate their support for fossil fuels and deforestation through subsidies, export credit insurances and other (indirect) forms of support.
  - The EU should address the issue of shrinking space for civil society organisations in partner countries. EU delegations in African countries need to ensure that local CSOs have a seat at the table to provide input. This may also encourage national governments to learn from these inclusive processes and institutionalise them. Moreover, the EU should ensure sufficient funding is available to support CSOs in African countries.

- Climate justice needs to become a guiding principle in the European Green Deal. The international context should be taken into account in all policies and EU law resulting from the Green Deal. The impact assessment framework should be used to ensure that policies do not come at the expense of other goals and commitments. Climate action should safeguard human rights and social and economic resilience everywhere in the world.

- Specifically, the final design of the CBAM and the Circular Economy Action Plan should take into account the effects on developing economies. Introduction should be made conditional on the implementation of a wide range of supporting measures for developing countries to prevent any negative impacts for them.

> *"Tackling climate change is about who has the means to decide on climate policies and who has the power to come into action. African countries and key stakeholders need to be included."*

ANNEX

This research was based on a combination of methods. Besides a thorough desk review of key policy documents and scholarly literature, field research was conducted through interviews and a widespread survey.

For this research it was vital to include African perspectives on climate change and action. Therefore, a survey on climate change and development issues was distributed among various African stakeholders through partner organisations working in Africa. Our analysis of African perspectives on the topic of climate action is predominantly based on the outcomes of the survey. It was completed by 99 respondents from 23 different countries all around the African continent. Many of the respondents are active in organisations in the non-profit field. The survey can be found below.

To show the impact of climate change on their daily lives, some of the respondents of the survey are quoted throughout this policy study. Furthermore, with the help of African journalists and other partners, we visualised these results in the form of different stories that show the diverse impacts of climate change. These can be found in chapter two. The full list of journalists and partners can be found below as well.

In addition, we analysed EU policies and climate projects through climate finance that focuses on Africa to assess the extent to which the EU's commitments match the needs identified by Africans themselves. We used the EU's fourth biennial report to the UNFCCC, which was published in December 2019 and covered the years 2017 and 2018.[149] This data set includes information on the contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels in 2017 and 2018. These projects are grants financed by the European Commission under its ODA budget. By looking into the specific projects the EU is conducting in Africa on climate action, including the budget for each project, we were able to analyse the priorities and credibility of EU climate finance. The analysis can be found in chapter three.

For chapters four and five desk research was crucial, in combination with interviews with experts, both from the EU as well as from African countries. The full list of experts interviewed can be found below.

149 United Nations, 'Fourth biennial reporting common tabular format.'

ANNEX

SURVEY RESULTS

In this annex you can find the four questions we asked with the number or respondents. In total, 99 respondents completed the survey. These respondents came from 23 different African countries: Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The respondents came predominantly from organisations working on climate change issues, as well as from development organisations.

After each multiple-choice question, respondents had the option to explain their answer and/or give examples. Some of these answers have been used in this policy study. Some of the respondents wished to remain anonymous. The questions and the answers given are listed below. Each question was obligatory, and thus answered by all the 99 respondents. Multiple answers could be given for each question.

1. What is/are the most visible consequence(s) of climate change you see in your community/country/region?

Answer	Number of respondents	Percentage*
Rising temperatures	56	56.6%
Heat extremes	41	41.4%
Irregular rainfall	67	67.7%
Droughts	41	41.4%
Sea-level rise	12	12.1%
Natural disasters	41	41.4%
Other	9	9.1%

2. What direct effect(s) of these consequences of climate change do you see/experience on the livelihood of the people in your community/country/region?

Answer	Number of respondents	Percentage*
Flooding	59	59.6%
Wildfires	11	11.1%
Damage to ecosystems	32	32.3%
Water scarcity	41	41.4%
Shrinking agricultural productivity	57	57.6%
Food insecurity	64	64.6%
Irregular energy supply	24	24.2%
Damage to infrastructure	22	22.2%
Decline in tourism	7	7.1%
Loss of capacity to work	11	11.1%
Rising conflict/insecurity	14	14.1%
Population movement	19	19.2%
Faster spread of disease	13	13.1%
Other	0	0.0%

3. What is/are the most important sector(s) to invest in to be able to deal with climate change in your community/country region?

Answer	Number of respondents	Percentage*
Stable energy supply	27	27.3%
Renewable energy	65	65.7%
Conservation ecosystems	53	53.5%
Circular economy	16	16.2%
Climate-proof agriculture	67	67.7%
Water resource management	43	43.4%
Climate-proof shelter/infrastructure	20	20.2%
Clean efficient transport	12	12.1%
Improved healthcare	17	17.2%
Sustainable waste management	36	36.4%
Political stability	17	17.2%
Sustainable tourism	7	7.1%
Humanitarian aid	18	18.2%
Other	2	2.0%

4. Who should take the responsibility when it comes to dealing with climate change in your community/country/region?

Answer	Number of respondents	Percentage*
Citizens	78	78.8%
Local organisations	45	45.5%
Local enterprises	22	22.2%
Local governments	57	57.6%
National governments	65	65.7%
NGOs	53	53.5%
International organisations	31	31.3%
Multinational companies	23	23.2%
Other	3	3.0%

** Respondents could give multiple answers, therefore the sum of the percentages is more than 100. The percentage is calculated by dividing the number or respondents for the specific answer by the total number of respondents (n=99)*

ANNEX

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

THE STORIES IN THE CHAPTERS HAVE BEEN COLLECTED BY OR WITH THE SUPPORT OF:

- Andrew Mambondiyani, *Climate Journalist, Zimbabwe*
- Appoline Olinga, *Coordinator Women's Journalist Organisations, DR Congo*
- Sanne van de Voort, *Project Officer, Women Engage for a Common Future, Netherlands*
- Kirsten Meijer, *Director, Women Engage for a Common Future Netherlands*
- Rukayatu Sanusi, *Executive Director, Ghana Climate Innovation Centre*
- Cameroon Gender and Environment Watch
- Action for Rural Women's Empowerment, *Uganda*

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES:

- Alphonse Muambi, *Netherlands*
- Arjen Naafs, *IRC WASH, Netherlands*
- Bertram Zagema, *Oxfam Novib, Netherlands*
- Charles Mwangi, *Pan African Climate Justice Alliance, Kenya*
- Hanne Knaepen, *ECDPM, Netherlands*
- Isabelle Geuskens, *Milieudefensie, Netherlands*
- Jan Willem den Besten, *IUCN, Netherlands*
- Jolein Baidenmann, *Netherlands*
- Kirsten Meijer, *Women Engage for a Common Future, Netherlands*
- Kiza Magendane, *Netherlands*
- Lau Schulpen, *Radboud University, Netherlands*
- Liesbeth van de Grift, *Utrecht University, Netherlands*
- Lisanne van der Steeg, *Woord en Daad, Netherlands*
- Manuel Voordewind, *Prisma, Netherlands*
- Marianne Kettunen, *Institute for European Environmental Policy, Belgium*
- Mattias Söderberg, *ActAlliance, Belgium*
- Mithika Mwenda, *Pan African Climate Justice Alliance, Kenya*
- Mohammed Chahim, *Member of European Parliament, Netherlands*
- Nils Mollema, *ActionAid, Netherlands*
- Rose Bagudu, *Socialists and Democrats, European Parliament*
- Rukayatu Sanusi, *Ghana Climate Innovation Centre*
- Saagar Doshi, *Africa in Motion, Netherlands/Tanzania*
- Salina Sanou, *Pan African Climate Justice Alliance, Kenya*

EXPERT MEETING PARTICIPANTS:

- Alphonse Muambi, *Netherlands*
- Ana Pirtskhalava, *Young European Socialists*
- Andrew Mambondiyani, *Climate Journalist, Zimbabwe*
- Anne van der Meer, *Foundation Max van der Stoel, Netherlands*
- Arjen Berkvens, *Foundation Max van der Stoel, Netherlands*
- Bernard Soulage, *Climate Chance Association, France*
- Charlotte Billingham, *Foundation for European Progressive Studies, Belgium*
- Dik Bol, *Stichting Haarlem-Mutare, Netherlands*
- Gift Sanyanga, *Stichting Haarlem-Mutare, Zimbabwe*
- Hans Opschoor, *International Institute of Social Studies, Netherlands*
- Julian Muhs, *Party of European Socialists, Belgium*
- Kirsten Meijer, *Women Engage for a Common Future, Netherlands*
- Liesbeth van de Grift, *Utrecht University, Netherlands*
- Louis Lemkow, *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain*
- Marcel Beukeboom, *Climate Envoy, Netherlands*
- Margot Loof, *Cordaid, Netherlands*
- Marianne Kettunen, *Institute for European Environmental Policy, Belgium*
- Mary Jane Enchill, *HATOF Foundation, Ghana*
- Nils Mollema, *ActionAid, Netherlands*
- Rachel Simon, *Climate Action Network, Belgium*
- Romain Crouzet, *Climate Chance Association, France*
- Rosa van Driel, *Foundation Max van der Stoel, Netherlands*
- Samuel Dotse, *HATOF Foundation, Ghana*
- Willem Wiskerke, *Milieudefensie, Netherlands*

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150 FEPS, *UNited for Climate Justice.*

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Climate change is perhaps the biggest challenge we face in the world today. People everywhere are struggling with its devastating effects, and Africa is one of the hardest hit regions. And yet, the most important decisions regarding climate action are often made by those who do not feel the biggest impact of the climate crisis and who generally have better capabilities to deal with the problems at hand. Especially for African countries, this makes the road to a climate-just transition long and winding.

This policy study shows the impact of climate change on the African continent, as told by Africans themselves, and discusses the role of the EU in its climate policies as well as other policies impacting Africa. To this aim, this policy study puts forward a set of progressive policy recommendations in order to incorporate the needs of African communities into the EU's own ambitious climate plans, and to ease the process of a climate-just transition across the African continent.

FEPS is the think tank of the progressive political family at EU level. Our mission is to develop innovative research, policy advice, training and debates to inspire and inform progressive politics and policies across Europe. We operate as hub for thinking to facilitate the emergence of progressive answers to the challenges that Europe faces today. FEPS works in close partnership with its members and partners, forging connections and boosting coherence among stakeholders from the world of politics, academia and civil society at local, regional, national, European and global levels.

FMS is a political foundation affiliated with the Dutch Labour Party. The vision of FMS stems from a social democratic background with international solidarity as its mission. The FMS believes that the voice of people in developing countries should resound in Dutch and European politics. In order to put development cooperation on the top of the political agenda, the FMS advocates fair Dutch and European politics and organises political debates and public events on international solidarity.

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